KASSERINE PASS BATTLES Readings - US Army Center Of Military ...

On January 10, CT,26, less third cattalicn, wit; the 1st Reconnaissance
Tx"oop attached, ryas ordered east and attached to II Ccrps for operation in
Southern TUNISIA . They were split up into Task Fcr ces by II Corps and operated
with armored elements in the GAFSA-SEBEITLA-FAIR area until the German breakthx"ough
southwest of PONT DU FANS, They were then ordered into the OUSSELTIA
VALLEY with Combat Command "B", 1st Armored Division, and assisted in restoring
the situation in that area .
Combat Team 26, less the second and third battalions and the lst'Reconnaissance
Troop, was then ordered to SEBEITLA, and took part in operations
around FAIR with Combat Command "A", 1st Armored Division .
They were then withdrawn to the KASSERINE PASS where they took part in
the heavy fighting which proceeded and followed the German break-through in
that area . They came back under Division control February 26th .
By January 20, the Division, less 26th and 18th Combat Teams: and certain
divisional- units, were at GUELMA which is 75 miles east of CONSTANTINE.
On January 18, the Division, less detachments, was ordered to join the
French %I% Corps. A sector was assigned the Division in the OUSSELTIA VALLEY
extending from PICHON N about thi~ miles . Six French infantry battalions
and two Tabors (Moroccan Irregulars) together with British, French, and American
artillery and tank units, were attached to the Division for the defense of this
sector . The thirty-mi.le sector was organized for a vigorous defense . It was
sub--divided into two sub-sectors with the various French Moroccan and British
units in the PICHON (right sector) with General Roosevelt in command. The left_
sub-sector was composed of First Division units under Colonel Fechet:who'd :
sands CT 16. The work of General Roosevelt in organizing his conglomerate
units was 6utstanding.
Activity in this sector was largely restricted to continual active patrol-_
ling and to artillery fire . Minor enemy attacks were quickly broken dorm .
Enomy air vas very active . The OrUSSErTIA VALLE'f is very flat and open . Day
light movement of combat vehicles in the VALLEY brought almost immediate straffi.ng.
Two German planes, particularly, nick-named "Ike and Mike" by the soldiers
were very annoying in their straffing and diving tactic . Even a lone jeep was
a fair target for "Ike and Mike" .
The French High Command discussed the advisability of the Division captor- _
ing DJEBEL BOU DABOUSS which was a commanding hill mass north o£ the HALFA PASS .
It dominated our left sub-sector . With the continued reverses in southern`
TUNISIA, an early withdrawal from positions east of the OUSSELTIA VALLEY teemed
inevitable . Consequently, it seemed futile to waste lives and materiel in capturing
this position . In football parlance taking this hill mass would have
been "battering our brains out to gain a yard and a half in the middle of the
field" . Accordingly, plans to capture this hill _was abandoned. This turned
out to be a wise decision, since the High Command later ordered us to withdraw
west across the OUSSELTIA VALLEY .