KASSERINE PASS BATTLES Readings - US Army Center Of Military ...

The 3rd Battalion, of the 16th Infantry Regiment, Lt . Col . Mathews . Comdg ., with special
anti-tank weapons attached, was located on the DJEBEL HAMRA (10 miles south of HALDRA), prepared
to block the northwest exit of the KASSERINE VALLEY, and to protect the mountain pass, leading west
to TEBFSSA .
The lst and 2nd Battalions (Lt . Col . Cunningham and Lt . Col . Crawford . Comdd .), of the
16th Infantry Regiment , from positions west of the KASSERINE VALLEY, had gained early contact with
the German follow-up infantry units, and attacked aggressively, at daylight, on 21 Feb . After considera-
ble close-in hard fighting, the German infantry units attempted to with-draw to the north , under close
pressure from the west, by the 16th Infantry assault battalions . But these German units incurred heavy
casualties when they found escape in that direction cut-off by the British and American tanks (with
close-in artillery support - located south of THALA) .
The 7th Field Artillery , Lt . Col . George Gibb, Comdg ., of the 1st Division Artillery , was
in close support of the 16th Infantry units, during this operation .
Allied Air Support was tremendously helpful at this time . American and British bombers
Joined in aseries of highly effective sorties, on the afternoon-of 21 Feb . . against the German tanks and
guns, which ,were then jammed-up "bumper to bumper" . In their hurry to escape being bottled up to
the KASSERINE VALLEY .
16 . The German Withdrawal .
Once the German withdrawal to the south had started, their evacuation of the KASSERIN£ VALLEY
was conducted with remarkable celerity . The lack of any pre-planning for an organized direct pursuit,
had delayed the regrouping of any mobile II Corps troops, for a quick , direct pursuit .
Thus, contact with the retreating German forces was lost, ani their withdrawal to the south was
effected without serious hindrance . A few days later, close contact was regained with the German units,
further south, at the same old stands, at GAFSA, MAKNASSY, FAID and PICHON .
The German High Command had "Shot the Works", 1n an all-out effort to setae the initiative . But,
from that time on, the end in TUNISIA . was Inevitable ; although the fighting became even more severe,
before the Allies had won the final victory in TUNISIA, on 13 May, 1943 .
To present a clear picture of the entire KASSERINE PASS Operation, there is included herein a
terrain analysis of that general area, and a chronological listing of the combat operations connected
therewith .
7 . Z, -,urxaAt1yn of the Cornhat np err- ticnt (Lead?ng up to and follov'!ng the ".SSERINE 7AF a'
Break-through)
Terrain Analysis (See Battle Map $2)
The Southern Tunisian Sector included a wild desert area, covering a frontage of 200 miles . interspersed
with a series of precipitous mountain ridges . The FAIR PASS (located fn the north central part
of that area) provided the only feasible route, through the south end of the GRAND DORSAL Mountain
Range . Control of this Pass was vitally important, both to the Germans and to the Allies_
From FAIR (near the west exit of the Pass), it was 10 miles due west, to SIDI BOU ZID; and thence
32 miles northwest . to SBEITLA . From SBIITLA it was 26 miles north (through the SBIITLA Pass) to SBIBA .
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