KASSERINE PASS BATTLES Readings - US Army Center Of Military ...

For the American forces, the KASSERINE PASS Operation had resulted in a bitter lesson . stressing
the need for cohesion and control , in the battle leadership of the major American combat units . It had
_aot been possible for Gen . Fredendall to exercise the proper cohesion and control of his tna jot units,
because of the conditions involved in Southern TUNISIA, during his period of command of the American
11 Corps . He war greatly handicapped . In this respect .
However, it happened that, early in March, '43, the American 11 Corps was_ then designated as a
separate autonomous command, responsible thereafter 2!qy to the new field commander, General Sir
Harold Alexander, of the British Army, who had been designated as field commander of the entire
Allied Forces in TUNISIA . This assurance of control of his major units, in the II Corps, had never
been available to Gen . Fredend4l, as it was later for his successors (Gen Patton and Gen Bradley) .
IV .
REASSEMMY OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION .
Rest Period at MORSOTT
Following the German retreat from the KASS~INE PASS area, on 21-23 Feb . . '43, the new German
defensive line was later re-established along the general line (GAFSA-SENED-MAKNASSY-FAIR-PICHON) .
After the German withdrawal to the south, the 1st Division was pulled back and regrouped, -on 1
Mar . . '43, near MORSOTT, northwest of TEBESSA . Here all units of the Division were reassembled,
rested and filled with replacements, preparatory to ftuther combat operations . A quick reorganization
was needed, as there had been considerable battle casualties, particularly in the Infantry units, some
of which had been almost continually in combat, since the landing at ORAN, on 8 Nov . . '42 . But,
with the 1st Division again reunited, there was a general feeling, throughout the Division, .w_genewed
confidence and combat esprit .
The 1st Division Battle School for Replacements
A Battle School, for incoming Replacements, assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, was established
at this time near MORSOTT; and ft continued in effect during the remainder of the campaign in N .
AFRLCA . This brief special course of instruction, for replacements, was conducted by a small selected
group of wattle wise officers and NCO'S, operating on e rotathtg basis , from the front line units . The
instruction included an orientation on the background and traditioru of the at D"vislon - a program of
intensive physical conditioning - special instruction in infantry weapons - scouting and patrolling -
night combat - and platoon combat exercises . -
As a result of this proc6dure in special Replacement training, the number of battle casualties was
greatly reduced, and the combat efficiency of all units was maintained at a higher level .
V. THE RECAPTURE OF GAFSA (16-17 Mar . . 1943
Strategic Value of GAFSA
GAFSA, a former French garrison town, was located on the edge of the desert, 60 miles south of
KASSERINE . It was then occupied by a garrison of German-Italian troops, having been evacuated by
the American 11 Corps, when the Germans broke through at FAID . on 14 February, 1943 . GAFSA had
strategical assets, as a road center and a railroad junction . Its re-capture was needed in order to providt
a railroad supply point for the British Eighth Army, then advancing from the south, through the caastal
area to the East .
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