Future of the Undersea Deterrent feb2020

Chapter 8 The Future of China’s New SSBN Force | Adam Ni
the other states are convinced that China’s nuclear modernisation
has only limited and defensive objectives. In contrast, if they interpret
the SSBN build-up as part of an aggressive effort to shift the
strategic balance in China’s favour, the risk of arms races would
rise significantly. Importantly, this may push the United States,
its allies, and others to enhance anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capabilities and intensify ASW efforts against China’s submarines.
China’s growing sea-based nuclear force gives Beijing the option
to adopt new nuclear strategies and postures, such as CASD.
However, this does not mean that it would be prudent for Beijing to
adopt some of these options in the near term. There is a significant
risk that what appears to Beijing as reasonable and defensive
efforts to shore up the variability of its nuclear deterrent will increasingly
be viewed with alarm by the United States and others.
Chinese SSBN Deployments and Maritime Asia
There are two main deployment strategies for China’s SSBN fleet
commonly discussed by Chinese and foreign experts: coastal
deployment in protected areas (the so-called “bastion” strategy)
and open-ocean deployment. 12
In the short to medium term, the PLAN will continue to adopt a
strategy that heavily emphasises SSBN deployments to selected
“bastions” near Chinese mainland, including areas of the South
China Sea, East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea. But, over the
long term, Chinese SSBNs are likely to be increasingly active in
conducting open-ocean patrols in the Pacific Ocean.
To be sure, the PLAN’s current focus on deploying SSBNs in
“bastion” areas close to the Chinese mainland has a number of
important advantages over sending its SSBNs to the Pacific. First,
patrol areas in the South China Sea are close to China’s SSBN
base on the southern coast of Hainan Island. This reduces the risk
to Chinese SSBNs on transit to patrol areas, and maximises the
time that SSBNs could spend in patrol areas. In contrast, in order
to reach patrol areas in the Pacific, Chinese SSBNs will need to
travel undetected through routes closely monitored by the United
States, Japan, and others into the Western Pacific. The reported
noisiness of China’s SSBNs is a key weakness that makes them
unlikely to be able to avoid detection on route. 13
Second, China could protect its SSBNs better against enemy
ASW forces in waters close to the Chinese mainland than those
farther away. The PLA can deploy a high concentration of maritime,
air, missile, and other defensive and power projection
forces to protect SSBNs operating in the South China Sea, for
example. Despite rapid recent improvements in the PLAN’s ASW
capabilities, including organic shipboard sensors and weapons,
ASW helicopters, land-based fixed-wing ASW platforms, seabed
sensors, and unmanned underwater vehicles, it still cannot adequately
protect its SSBN force operating in the Western Pacific
against advanced foes. 14
Third, the proximity of “bastion” areas to Chinese mainland or island
features with dual-use infrastructure means that Chinese SSBNs
could rely on existing logistics, communications, and command
and control systems. The same systems would be stretched or
ineffective in providing operational support to Chinese SSBN
patrols in the Pacific.
Despite the above advantages, the “bastion” strategy also has key
weaknesses that limit the deterrence potential of China’s SSBN
force. Importantly, the range of China’s JL-2 SLBM, estimated to
be just over 7,000 kilometres, 15 is not enough to reach the continental
United States from Chinese coastal waters. This means that
Chinese SSBNs armed with JL-2s will need to navigate further west
into potentially hostile waters in order to maximise deterrence. 16
This limitation could be ameliorated by JL-2’s follow up, the JL-
3, which is reportedly under development and includes a range
upgrade. 17 However, it is unlikely that the PLAN’s next-generation
Type 096s armed with JL-3s would have sufficient range to hold
targets on the continental United States at risk from waters in the
Chinese “bastions.”
In addition, whereas the vast waters of the Pacific Ocean provide
flexibility in terms of patrol areas and launch locations, the
“bastion” areas only give limited options. It would be far easier to
monitor Chinese coastal waters than the vastness of the Pacific
for Chinese SSBN activities. Moreover, Chinese SLBM launches
could be easier to track and intercept when they are launched
from Chinese coastal waters (where they are expected) as opposed
to a surprise launch location somewhere in the Pacific. 18
12
For a more comprehensive discussion, see Zhao, Tides of Change, 25–33.
13
Hans M. Kristensen, “China’s Noisy Nuclear Submarines,” Federation of American Scientists Blog, November 21, 2009, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2009/11/subnoise/.
14
On PLAN’s growing ASW capabilities, see Rick Joe, “The Chinese Navy’s Growing Anti-Submarine Warfare Capabilities,” The Diplomat, September
12, 2018; and Rick Joe, “Chinese Anti-Submarine Warfare: Aviation Platforms, Strategy, and Doctrine,” The Diplomat, October 16, 2018.
15
National Air and Space Intelligence Center, US Air Force, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, July 2017, 33.
16
Kristensen and Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2018,” 293.
17
Bill Gertz, “China Flight Tests New Submarine-Launched Missile,” The Washington Free Beacon, December 18, 2018, https://freebeacon.
com/national-security/china-flight-tests-new-submarine-launched-missile/; and Ankit Panda, “China Conducts First Test of New JL-3 Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missile,” The Diplomat, December 20, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/china-conducts-first-test-of-new-jl-3-submarine-launched-ballistic-missile/.
18
Zhao, Tides of Change, 29.
30