YDS 2021 in Review

realpolitik, it did not pretend to solely
invoke concerns about human rights,
and explicitly called on Cambodia to
“reduce the influence of the PRC
military in Cambodia, which threatens
regional and global security”. Just as
well, because pro-establishment media
in Cambodia was quick to point out
with mirth that the US hypocritically
provides Vietnam with military
assistance, despite its communist
leadership and questionable human
rights record.
Observers have pointed out that the
sanctions are largely symbolic, given
that the U.S does not supply arms to
Cambodia. However, the State
Department also warned U.S.
businesses against investing in
Cambodia in the financial, real estate,
casino, infrastructure, manufacturing,
and timber sectors, due to human
rights and drug-trafficking concerns.
Sanctions expert Peter Kucik has
suggested that US sanctions may be
painful for Cambodia, if they also
influence the behaviour of US allies.
Nevertheless, the US has limited
leverage to influence the behaviour of
Cambodian dictator Hun Sen, who has
been in power for 36 years. While the
US is a major market for Cambodian
textile exports, US policymakers have
conceded that sanctions on the textile
industry would hurt already vulnerable
workers most, and potentially be a selfdefeating
strategy, solidifying
Cambodian resistance against US
interference.
Unfortunately, it is criticism of
Cambodia’s human rights that pushed it
so close to China in the first place, and
the most recent US sanctions will be no
different. Of Cambodia’s Foreign Direct
Investment, 43 per cent came from
China in 2019, with an additional US
$588 million pledged in aid between
2019-2021, making China Cambodia’s
largest economic partner. China is
happy to provide generous funds, even
as Hun Sen has cracked down on civil
society, dissolved the opposition party,
and exploited the pandemic emergency
to jail opponents for 20 years for
health-related offences. With a new
bilateral FTA to come into force on
January 1, 2022, China-Cambodia
relations seem closer than ever. In
return for Chinese support, Cambodia
has acted as China’s pawn within
ASEAN, and has twice blocked ASEAN
resolutions (which rely on unanimous
consensus) on the South China Sea in
2012 and 2016. Tensions are running
high, as Cambodia is set to chair
ASEAN’s next two summits in 2022.
Although it is true that the US cannot
claim the moral high ground in this
latest proxy-spat, neither can China.
Given Hun Sen’s unswerving grip on
power, and US determination to
pressure China in the Indo-Pacific,
Cambodia is playing out as yet another
backdrop to great power rivalry.
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