Commando Edition 17 2023

marines operating from Australian bases into the Java
and South China Seas. 4 Submarines had been exper -
iencing considerable trouble from Japanese coast
defence batteries on the southwest corner of Lombok
covering the southern entrance to the Lombok Strait. 5,6
The batteries consisted of a 3-gun battery (5.5” or 6”
calibre) and two single guns of unknown calibre. Allied
air strikes were launched on 7, 9 and 12 January 1945
and aerial photography suggested that the main
battery had been put out of action, but that the two
single gun positions remained intact. The United States
Navy Combined Task Force 71 (CTF 71) 7 wanted intel -
li gence on: bomb damage caused to the coast
defences; the presence of any further hidden defences;
and progress of repairs to these defences.
Figure 3 - Battle Damage Assessment after the air strike of
9 January 1945, showing the 3 co-located gun positions, from the
STARFISH Outline Plan. 9 STARFISH’s role in Phase 1 was to confirm
the damage, monitor repairs and locate any other guns.
Figure 2 - The target area, showing the 3 guns, a fourth gun just to
the north-east of the 3 and reference to another fifth gun “further
north” (off the photograph), from the STARFISH Outline Plan. 8
STARFISH never actually got to the target area.
4
The native craft HMAS KRAIT carrying the JAYWICK party from SOA had
transited the Lombok Strait in September and October 1943 on the way
to and from the target area off Singapore. HM Submarine PORPOISE
carrying the RIMAU party bound for the same target area transited the
same strait on the surface by night in Sep 1944.
5
The southern entrance to the strait is only about 20 km wide.
6
SRD Projects Summary September 1945, digital p. 100 was a little more
explicit, saying “on a number of occasions subs had been shelled and
damaged.”
7
Described as “the Allied Submarine Command at Fremantle” in
Courtney, G.B., Silent Feet – The History of “Z” Special Operations
1942-1945, (Slouch Hat Publications, 1993), p. 238.
8
NAA 235188, digital p. 165 9
NAA 235188, digital p. 164.
SOA
SOA Advanced HQ was in Morotai (in what is now
the North Moluccas province of Indonesia) and the
SOA HQ unit controlling operations in Java, Bali,
Lombok and Timor and the islands in between them
was Group D, based at the Allied Intelligence Bureau’s
(AIB) Lugger Maintenance Section (LMS) near Darwin.
The SOA radio station at Leanyer, near Darwin,
provided the communications link between parties in
the field and Group D and SOA HQ. SOA Rear HQ
remained in Melbourne.
For SOA this period was the beginning of its most
significant contribution of the war, including acting in
direct support of the Australian military landings in
British and Dutch Borneo. The initial deployments of
three significant SOA Borneo operations had just
begun:
• AGAS I had just been landed in British North
Borneo.
• SEMUT I, II and III had just been landed in
Sarawak; and
• PLATYPUS I had just been landed near Balik -
papan, in support of the upcoming OBOE 2.
There were at this time some minor SOA opera -
tions, in co-operation with the Dutch, in those islands
in the eastern part of the NEI still under Japanese
control; and the operations accompanying US sub -
marine war patrols (OPTICIAN) operating in the South
China Sea were still underway. In Portuguese Timor,
the tragedy of the destruction and/or capture and
hostile turning of the communications of almost all the
SOA parties continued until the end of the war.
What we know of Operation STARFISH
There are a number of accounts – both official and
popular – of STARFISH already in the public domain.
14 COMMANDO ~ The Magazine of the Australian Commando Association ~ Edition 17 I 2023