Commando Edition 17 2023

Postscript
On arrival back in Darwin on 2 May 1945, Black and
Hoffie suggested there was a possibility that Crofton-
Moss and Gillies might still be alive and could make
their way to a cached radio and rubber dinghy.
Accord ingly the alternate submarine RV was retained
for a day or two, before being cancelled. In mid-May
1945 another story reached SOA that a survivor may be
present in the area. On further investigation, that
information appeared to refer to the earlier move -
ments of Black and Hoffie, who had already been
extracted. 47
The SOA Official History Vol 1 (Organisation) of
1946 noted both Crofton-Moss (“Brit Army Gen list”) 48
and Gillies (“AMF – Z Special Unit”) 49 as “Missing
believed killed”.
After the war, interrogation of surrendered
Japanese staff officers who had been stationed in
Lombok, reveals that they remembered having heard
of STARFISH’s insertion and pursuit. They said that “as
many of their garrison as possible were utilised in the
chase.” 50 Speaking in 2003, Black said both Crofton-
Moss and Gillies had been captured by the Japanese
and later beheaded in Mataram (the capital of
Lombok). After the war, the Commonwealth War
Graves Commission found their beheaded bodies
buried at Mataram 51,52 and the bodies were sub -
sequently re-buried in the Commonwealth War Graves
Com mis sion Ambon War Cemetery in Maluku,
Indonesia. 53,54,55
Black recovered quickly from the ordeal, while
Hoffie, who had fallen ill during the operation, on
return to Australia was hospitalised for 6 months. 56 Alex
Hoffie died in 1996 and Lawrie Black died in 2009. 57
Conclusions
We can draw a number of still relevant conclusions
from STARFISH.
This SOA operation was launched after con -
ventional means – air strikes and aerial photo graphy -
had been inconclusive. It therefore sought to meet an
47
NAA 235118 digital pp. 104, 27
48
NAA A3269, O7/A (Item 235324) Special Operations Australia Vol I
(Organisation). digital p. 45. There is also a published version of this at
Brown, C.A., The Official History of Special Operations - Australia, Vol 1
Organisation, (SOA Books, 2011)
49
NAA 235324, digital p. 46
50
SOE file HS1-253, a report of 26 Nov 1945 entitled “re Personnel
Missing on SRD operations in the Now Timorforce Area of Control.”
51
At War Interview Tape 6, 23:00 to 25:00
52
SOE file HS1-253 on p. 4 of an undated, unsigned 4-page report on
STARFISH
53
https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/R1709175
54
Milne, op cit
55
See the Commonwealth War Graves Commission website - and
56
ACA Interview 44:20. Black said that Hoffie had fallen ill with Blackwater
Fever.
57
Milne, op cit
otherwise unachievable aim and was undertaken to
meet specific and important IREQs of CTF 71.
No plan survives contact with the enemy (or nature)
– and almost everything that could have gone wrong
did:
• The sea insertion and extraction aspects were
fraught – on the initial insertion the motor and
radio communications were swamped going in
and the party had to paddle their way out to sea
to RV with the submarine again, relying on the
submarine to find them; the second insertion
almost foundered on rocks in a strong current;
on the sea transit back to the area of their
extraction point the inflatable motor proved
difficult to refuel and eventually ran out of fuel 58 ;
and on the extraction itself, the ferry party’s craft
capsized;
• One member simply disappeared after a dis -
agreement with his colleague about which route
to take – he was carrying cyphers, was in -
explicably unarmed and was captured by the
enemy.
• The party was surprised by a superior enemy
force in their advanced camp and in the con -
fusion another party member was captured.
• Because they had destroyed their com muni -
cations equipment just before the extraction,
they were not aware that a second Allied aircraft
was flying cover for the Catalina pickup. Initially
they thought this second aircraft was an enemy.
Had they not fortuitously at the last moment
recognised the second aircraft as an Allied plane
though, they might not have been picked up;
and
• From the time of the Japanese attack on their
advanced camp on 24 April the party had
progres sively less equipment. By the time of
their extraction on 2 May 1945 all they had
essentially was four hand grenades, one pistol,
fire lighting accessories, probably a compass
and the clothes they stood in. 59
Manifestly communications were vital for mission
success and survival and, for the most part, com muni -
cations worked reasonably well between the field and
Darwin – 21 messages were received by Darwin and
twenty by STARFISH. There was signals expertise
within the team and the problematic radio battery pack
was able to be kept working long enough to be
replaced in the air drop on 14 April. From 19 April on
however, communications from the field degraded
signi ficantly – the main cypher key was compromised
with Crofton-Moss’ disappearance/capture that day
necessitating the use of a memorised emergency
cypher, which had also to be assumed to be known to
58
ACA Interview 29:00
59
ACA Interview 36:10
20 COMMANDO ~ The Magazine of the Australian Commando Association ~ Edition 17 I 2023