Commando Edition 17 2023

• As a result of the debrief of the two surviving
party members in Darwin, a 7-page report dated
28 May 1945 was produced containing inci -
dental information gleaned during their time
there – covering enemy strengths, disposition
and activity; geographical information; weather;
and social/political/economic observations; 69
• On file there are also one report (dated 11 May
1945) preliminary to the fuller debrief and at
least five other reports produced during the
party’s time ashore, which were distributed by
AIB HQ to relevant customers as AIB product,
attributed to “SRD Project - STARFISH”. See
Attachment ‘A’ for an example of such a report.
• Except for providing negative information about
the absence of coastal defence guns north of
Cape Batugendang, 70 CTF 71’s Intelligence
Require ments (IREQ) were barely answered.
With an eye to the eventual Dutch reoccupation
of the NEI, NEFIS were however keenly inte -
rested in social/political/economic intel ligence.
Having said that, this was a remote corner of a
remote island, and the Dutch were already get -
ting similar information from those parts of the
NEI already reoccupied and from there and
other AIB listening posts in the still Japaneseoccupied
eastern parts of the NEI. The prize of
social/political/economic intel li gence on what
was happening in the main island of Java still
eluded the Dutch and it is hard to imagine that
any information obtained, or observations made
by the party were of any real use; and
• Perhaps CTF 71 had learned to live with what
had presumably become the much-reduced
threat posed by the coastal defence guns on the
southern entrance to the Lombok Strait, and in
any case the war would be over in a few months’
time. Notwithstanding the hardships faced by
the party; their endurance; and their bravery, the
mission was hardly successful – and half the
members perished.
Geography does not change and in the event of any
future major conflict in South Asia, the Lombok Strait
will remain a key sea line of communication. Future
missions to neutralise a threat there or to dominate the
strait may, in the first instance at least, be carried out by
more modern technical means. This does not of course
rule out the fall-back of reconnaissance (or a strike by
land-based forces) in probably a similar manner as
carried out by STARFISH.
Attachment ‘A’ – Operational Records
Figure 16 - A map showing the 3 possible coast defence guns
north of Cape Batugendang; the 3 guns at the main target area;
one gun just northeast of the 3 guns; and another single gun about
5 km north east of the that area. The reconnaissance probably only
got as far as the point marked “steile bergwand” (Dutch for “steep
cliff”) marked just south of the main target.
From the STARFISH Outline Plan. 71
69
NAA 235188, digital pp. 2-9
70
See Attachment ‘A’
71
NAA 235188, digital p. 158
72
NAA 235188, digital p. 154
73 71
NAA 235327, digital p. 108 NAA 235188, digital p. 158
22 COMMANDO ~ The Magazine of the Australian Commando Association ~ Edition 17 I 2023