A review of HSE's risk analysis and protection-based analysis ...

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Date Description Effect Accident Type 24/07/1994Liquid slug entered flare line 26 injured (1 Explosion, during process upset and caused hospitalised, on-site), Fire pipe to rupture. Flammable some off-site property materials ignited giving damage (mainly explosion and fires. window breakage) 03/09/1994A bulk chlorine storage tank was 5 people injured (on overfilled from a road tanker (thesite) load cell was out of calibration) lead to a release of chlorine from the vent scrubber. Release 04/08/1994Release of petrol and fire when operator parted flanges to insert a blind. 17/01/1995Explosion in pipeline during rigging operation, with subsequent fire. 20/07/1995Fire at LPG cylinder filling plant, jet flames impinging on storage vessel, but escalation prevented. Cause not given. 05/02/1996Failure of water seal on gas holder causing loss of natural gas. No ignition. 1 fatality (on-site), 7 Fire emergency personnel injured Not given Explosion, Fire 1 injury (on-site). 150 people evacuated (offsite), power lines affected. 17/07/1996Release of sulphuric acid mist 1 injury (on-site). 10 when water applied to a sulphur people (off-site) trioxide vessel. reported to hospitals complaining of eye and respiratory irritation. 03/10/1996Wrong material off-loaded from tanker to storage vessel, giving exothermic reaction with contents. Storage vessel was overpressurised and released flammable vapour which ignited. Fire spread to adjacent drum storage area. Site Type Category Comment Refinery 1 Potential magnitude of event similar to that for the representative event(s) for this type of installation Bulk chlorine storage (chemical manufacturing) Storage of flammable liquids Storage of flammable liquids Fire LPG bulk / cylinders 3 Assessment only considers releases from parts of plant where dangerous substances normally present. 1 This is a precursor to a pool fire, which sould be covered by a protection based assessment for bulk storage of flammable liquids 1 Potential magnitude of event similar to that for the representative event(s) for this type of installation 1 This is a precursor to a BLEVE incident, which is addressed by the protection based assessment for LPG installations. None Release Gas holder 1 Seal fires addressed (in protection based assessment) 6 firefighters hospitalised, significant numbers of public reported respiratory problems, eye irritation, nausea etc. Release Explosion, Fire Sulphur trioxide storage Chemicals manufacturing 3 Releases of sulphuric acid mist would be considered within the QRA methodology, but not as a result of this kind of cause. 1 Potential magnitude of event similar to that for the representative event(s) for this type of installation
Date Description Effect Accident Type 24/01/1997Damage to steam injector on the water supply to the seals on a gas holder led, indirectly, to loss of water from the seal and release of gas. No ignition. 07/02/1997Confusion over instructions led to overfilling of a storage tank with ethanol during ship offloading. No ignition. 04/05/1997High pressure naptha entered a low pressure 'brine string' on a brine storage cavity. Release through relief valve and burst flange seal. 01/07/1997Release from LNG tank during modification work on piping. Site Type Category Comment None Release Gas holder 1 Seal fires addressed (in protection based assessment) None Release Storage of flammable liquids 4 injured (on site) Release Brine Cavity Storage 1 This is a precursor to a pool fire, which sould be covered by a protection based assessment for bulk storage of flammable liquids 1 Potential magnitude of event similar to that for the representative event(s) for this type of installation None Release LNG Storage 1 QRA methodology addresses leaks from storage tanks 06/07/1997Slug catcher shut in and pressure None Release Gas Terminal 4 The assessment approach for this type of increased due to thermal expansion. Pressure relieved through PRV, which failed to reseat. installation depends on site-specific details. 16/09/1997Failure of wall / floor weld on storage tank led to release of xylene. No ignition 01/11/1997Petrol storage tank overfilled after failure of gauging system, material spilt into bund. No ignition. 09/03/1998Valve opened during maintenance work giving release of organic substances. Wrong valve had been isolated. No ignition. 22/08/1998Weld failed on floating roof drain on a gasoline storage tank. Liquid released into bund, no ignition. None None None None Release Storage of flammable liquids Release Storage of flammable liquids Release Chemicals manufacturing Release Storage of flammable liquids 1 This is a precursor to a pool fire, which sould be covered by a protection based assessment for bulk storage of flammable liquids 1 This is a precursor to a pool fire, which sould be covered by a protection based assessment for bulk storage of flammable liquids 1 Potential magnitude of event less than that for the representative event(s) for this type of installation 1 This is a precursor to a pool fire, which sould be covered by a protection based assessment for bulk storage of flammable liquids
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www.erm.com Delivering sustainable
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CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 INTROD
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Health and Sa
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• certain assumptions relating to
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REVIEW OF ASSUMPTIONS USED Overall
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1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 BACKGROUND The H
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worthwhile (sometimes almost total)
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1.3.1 Study Definition The Study De
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The data are derived from records o
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• severe distress to almost every
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1.3.7 Risk Evaluation Once a numeri
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• selecting the event or events u
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2 REVIEW OF HSE’S RISK ANALYSIS A
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• HSE, UK; • NCSR Demokritos, S
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2.2.1 Comparison of Accident Experi
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support the findings of the work on
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The findings of the ASSURANCE Proje
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2.3.1 Comparison with Historical Ac
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Table 2.3 Estimated Number of Sites
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teams concerning site-specific deta
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2.4.1 Model and Methodology Evaluat
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for people indoors would be somewha
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occurred, originating from the pipi
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the predicted burn area). However,
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stadium were declared unusable. A t
Page 51 and 52: For example, assume that the harm c
Page 53 and 54: Table 2.5 Concentrations Required t
Page 55 and 56: Figure 2.6 Concentrations Required
Page 57 and 58: 2.4.5 Choice of Harm Criterion Curr
Page 59 and 60: Figure 2.9 Variation in Risk of Dan
Page 61 and 62: Figure 2.10 Risk Analysis Process -
Page 63 and 64: easonable correspondence between th
Page 65 and 66: • “the possibility that the pro
Page 67 and 68: a risk analysis, and those for MHI
Page 69 and 70: 3.2.5 General Points - Recommendati
Page 71 and 72: According to reviews performed on b
Page 73 and 74: 4 REVIEW OF ASSUMPTIONS USED Table
Page 75 and 76: Table 4.1 Assumptions Used in HSE A
Page 77 and 78: Assumption Explanation Application
Page 79 and 80: Assumption Explanation Application
Page 81 and 82: 4. HSE perform further investigatio
Page 83 and 84: Risk Analysis Element Review Approa
Page 85 and 86: 9. HSE continues to perform researc
Page 87 and 88: Review Area Specific Subjects Revie
Page 89 and 90: Table 5.3 Summary of Review Finding
Page 91 and 92: 5.3.2 Recommendation It is recommen
Page 93 and 94: Annex A Details of Incidents Report
Page 95 and 96: Table A1.1 Accidents Reported to th
Page 97 and 98: Date Description Effect Accident Ty
Page 101: Date Description Effect Accident Ty
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