A review of HSE's risk analysis and protection-based analysis ...

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2.2.3 ASSURANCE Project Findings The study found that the participants used several different techniques for identifying hazards. Some participants used a combination of complementary approaches. The participants used broadly similar techniques (known as risk ranking) to whittle down the initial list of events produced by the hazard identification exercise and to select those that should be included in the subsequent steps of the risk analysis. The overall finding was that the events selected by the participants differed substantially in terms of the details, but that there was good agreement as to which events were considered the most important. Hence it appears that, with regard to the most important events at least, HSE’s approach is comparable to those used by other practitioners. 2.2.4 Conclusions – Hazard Identification The review of research comparing QRA approaches with accident experience as reported in this Section indicates that the approach used by HSE is generally adequate for the relatively simple installations for which HSE currently performs QRAs. Comparison with accident experience at UK COMAH establishments (1) shows that the majority of incidents detailed in the accident records would have either been identified in a QRA, or would have been similar to or less onerous in magnitude than the event(s) considered in a protection-based analysis. However, there are a four recommendations arising out of this part of the review. The recommendations are: 1. that HSE consider supplementing the ‘top down’ (see Section 1.3.2) approach to the identification of hazards with other methods, if in the future HSE seeks to apply QRA to types of plants more complex than those currently analysed using QRA; 2. that HSE considers whether events resulting in unintended releases from vents (such as vessel overfill during transfers from road tankers) should be included in risk analyses for sites storing chlorine or other pressurised liquefied gases; 3. that in the case of sites storing or using water reactive materials (such as sulphur trioxide), HSE considers whether the risk analysis should include scenarios where water is inadvertently added to the dangerous substance (for example, where water may be used for cleaning of tanks or equipment); and, 4. that HSE performs further investigations into the significance of hazards arising from undesired chemical reactions and, if necessary, develops a means of including such hazards in a risk analysis. (1) Establishments covered by the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (COMAH). ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT HSE 0016072 AUGUST 2004 22
The findings of the ASSURANCE Project show that the results obtained using HSE’s approach were comparable with those of the other participants, particularly with regard to the most significant events. ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT HSE 0016072 AUGUST 2004 23
Page 1 and 2: www.erm.com Delivering sustainable
Page 3 and 4: CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 INTROD
Page 5 and 6: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Health and Sa
Page 7 and 8: • certain assumptions relating to
Page 9 and 10: REVIEW OF ASSUMPTIONS USED Overall
Page 11 and 12: 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 BACKGROUND The H
Page 13 and 14: worthwhile (sometimes almost total)
Page 15 and 16: 1.3.1 Study Definition The Study De
Page 17 and 18: The data are derived from records o
Page 19 and 20: • severe distress to almost every
Page 21 and 22: 1.3.7 Risk Evaluation Once a numeri
Page 23 and 24: • selecting the event or events u
Page 25 and 26: 2 REVIEW OF HSE’S RISK ANALYSIS A
Page 27 and 28: • HSE, UK; • NCSR Demokritos, S
Page 29 and 30: 2.2.1 Comparison of Accident Experi
Page 31: support the findings of the work on
Page 35 and 36: 2.3.1 Comparison with Historical Ac
Page 37 and 38: Table 2.3 Estimated Number of Sites
Page 39 and 40: teams concerning site-specific deta
Page 41 and 42: 2.4.1 Model and Methodology Evaluat
Page 43 and 44: for people indoors would be somewha
Page 45 and 46: occurred, originating from the pipi
Page 47 and 48: the predicted burn area). However,
Page 49 and 50: stadium were declared unusable. A t
Page 51 and 52: For example, assume that the harm c
Page 53 and 54: Table 2.5 Concentrations Required t
Page 55 and 56: Figure 2.6 Concentrations Required
Page 57 and 58: 2.4.5 Choice of Harm Criterion Curr
Page 59 and 60: Figure 2.9 Variation in Risk of Dan
Page 61 and 62: Figure 2.10 Risk Analysis Process -
Page 63 and 64: easonable correspondence between th
Page 65 and 66: • “the possibility that the pro
Page 67 and 68: a risk analysis, and those for MHI
Page 69 and 70: 3.2.5 General Points - Recommendati
Page 71 and 72: According to reviews performed on b
Page 73 and 74: 4 REVIEW OF ASSUMPTIONS USED Table
Page 75 and 76: Table 4.1 Assumptions Used in HSE A
Page 77 and 78: Assumption Explanation Application
Page 79 and 80: Assumption Explanation Application
Page 81 and 82: 4. HSE perform further investigatio
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Risk Analysis Element Review Approa
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9. HSE continues to perform researc
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Review Area Specific Subjects Revie
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Table 5.3 Summary of Review Finding
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5.3.2 Recommendation It is recommen
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Annex A Details of Incidents Report
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Table A1.1 Accidents Reported to th
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Date Description Effect Accident Ty
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