bahrain

experience in the 1980’s. It was my practice as Ambassador to attend the family
mourning assemblies whenever any prominent figure died. On several occasions at
mourning for a member of the Shia community, I found the then Ruler or his brother the
Prime Minister, present on the same errand to pay his condolences; there was no pomp,
circumstance or security. In some respects it was still like a small village community,
with much of the mutual respect that implies.
3) The Systemic Problem
Nevertheless, there is a long term systemic problem which is simply that the Royal
Family, with their close adherents took over Bahrain in the eighteenth century as
incomers from the tribal, nomadic society of Arabia, and have ever since ruled over the
indigenous, sedentary Baharna majority. That the Al Khalifa are Sunni and their subjects
Shia makes matters worse but is not the prime cause of friction, which is the natural
dissatisfaction of a majority permanently excluded from supreme power, together with
resentment at the privilege of the ruling class. Over time the level of discontent has
fluctuated and for long periods the Al Khalifa have coopted the support of the majority.
But it was natural that events in Tunisia and Egypt should trigger (not cause) a crisis in
2001.
This systemic problem is made worse by historic Iranian claims to sovereignty over
Bahrain. This claim, withdrawn by the Shah in 1971, was reactivated by the Islamic
Revolution in 1979, with the added factor of Iranian aspirations to defend Shia
communities throughout the region. The Gulf Arab response was to establish the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) as a common shield against Iranian (and in another context,
possible Iraqi) encroachment. Even so, there was a failed assassination/coup attempt in
December 1981, shortly after my arrival; the background was never clear but the
Government blamed Iranian subversion.
By no means all Baharna are opposed to Al Khalifa rule and not all opposition activists
are Shia. In an older generation young men from all backgrounds might be Nasserite or
Baathist firebrands and later became pillars of the establishment. Now their successors
are Salafist Sunni, whose wish to end Bahrain’s liberal ways threatens the economy but
this is a wider issue for the Islamic world, not endemic to Bahrain. Meanwhile, a
substantial educated middle class are keen to see better, more accountable Government,
but are fearful of Islamic enthusiasm and its implications.
4) Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the GCC
Solidarity within the GCC and support from Saudi Arabia are not cost free. With close
family and social links, Bahrain is economically dependent on its major neighbour but
they are very different societies. While liberal, inclusive, religiously tolerant Bahrain has
turned these differences to its economic advantage, Saudi financial support and access to
Saudi oil at a preferential rate remain essential. This comes at a price.
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