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Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation, Second Edition

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324 CHAPTER 18 COMPLEX STRUCTURES<br />

(b) Using <strong>the</strong> IVpost <strong>of</strong> $24.26M <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> same base-case assumptions as in part (b), we can<br />

use FLEX Calculator to compute <strong>the</strong> partial valuation <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> carve-out (Equation (18.1) as<br />

$1.52M. ’<br />

The previous example used a proportional carve-out. It is also possible to<br />

have discrete payouts at preset trigger points. The next example illustrates this case.<br />

EXAMPLE 18.2<br />

We use <strong>the</strong> same setup as in Example 18.1, but this time with a different structure for <strong>the</strong><br />

management carve-out. Now, following <strong>the</strong> $12M Series E investment from Vulture <strong>Venture</strong>s<br />

(50M shares <strong>of</strong> CP with a 3X liquidation preference), management is promised <strong>the</strong><br />

following incentives: If Newco has an exit <strong>of</strong> at least $50M, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> employees will receive<br />

$5M from <strong>the</strong>se proceeds. If Newco has an exit <strong>of</strong> at least $80M, <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> employees will<br />

receive an additional $5M from <strong>the</strong>se proceeds. The earlier investors have 40M shares <strong>of</strong><br />

common, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> employees have claims on a fur<strong>the</strong>r 10M shares.<br />

Problems<br />

(a) Draw <strong>and</strong> read <strong>the</strong> exit diagrams for <strong>the</strong> management carve-out, for <strong>the</strong> Series E, <strong>and</strong> for<br />

all o<strong>the</strong>r investors combined.<br />

(b) Compute <strong>the</strong> breakeven valuation for <strong>the</strong> Series E investment under base-case assumptions.<br />

(c) Compute <strong>the</strong> implied valuation for <strong>the</strong> management carve-out under base-case assumptions.<br />

Solutions<br />

We begin by drawing <strong>the</strong> exit diagram for <strong>the</strong> carve-out in Exhibit 18-4. Here, we have<br />

discrete jumps in <strong>the</strong> payouts to management at $50M <strong>and</strong> $80M.<br />

We can read this diagram as<br />

Partial valuation <strong>of</strong> management carve-out 5 5 BCð50Þ 1 5 BCð80Þ: ð18:6Þ<br />

We next turn to <strong>the</strong> Series E stake. Now <strong>the</strong> main complication is to adjust properly for<br />

<strong>the</strong> discrete payouts. Without doing some calculations, we cannot tell whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> jumps<br />

occur below or above <strong>the</strong> conversion point. In principle, it is possible that nei<strong>the</strong>r payout<br />

occurs before conversion (if W E , 50), that only <strong>the</strong> first one does (50 , W E 80), or that both<br />

do (WE . 80). The only way to know for sure is to compute all <strong>the</strong> cases <strong>and</strong> look for logical<br />

contradictions. For example, Series E conversion condition, if occurs below <strong>the</strong> first payout<br />

(W E , 50):<br />

1=2 W . 36M-WE 5 $72M: ð18:7Þ<br />

This condition gives us a contradiction, because if WE is equal to $72M, we should<br />

have to include a payout (because W E . 50). Thus, Equation (18.7) is not a proper conversion<br />

condition.<br />

We next consider <strong>the</strong> possibility that $50M , WE , $80M.

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