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Timothy Van Zandt - Insead

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Chapter 10<br />

Explicit Price Discrimination<br />

10.1 Motivation and objectives<br />

Broadly<br />

Figure 10.1<br />

$<br />

30<br />

25<br />

20<br />

15<br />

10<br />

5<br />

Profit<br />

Cost<br />

Consumer<br />

surplus<br />

Deadweight<br />

loss<br />

d(P )<br />

2 4 6 8 10 12 14<br />

mc(Q)<br />

Figure 10.1 shows our familiar illustration of the deadweight loss and of the distribution<br />

of surplus for a firm with market power. The firm’s manager is happy to see the large region<br />

labeled “profit”, but she feels disappointed for two reasons. First, the customers are getting<br />

away with some surplus. Second, some potential gains from trade (the deadweight loss) are<br />

not realized and hence go to no one. Ideally, she would like to generate all possible gains<br />

from trade and extract these gains for the firm.<br />

Her problem is not a lack of bargaining power. Her firm can make a take-it-or-leave-it<br />

price offer that allows for no haggling. Yet changing the price trades off consumer surplus<br />

for deadweight loss and so cannot eliminate both of them.<br />

Chapters 10, 11, and 12 examine more sophisticated pricing strategies that increase<br />

profits by expanding gains from trade and reducing consumer surplus.<br />

Firms, Prices, and Markets ©August 2012 <strong>Timothy</strong> <strong>Van</strong> <strong>Zandt</strong><br />

Q

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