Timothy Van Zandt - Insead

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iv Firms, Prices, and Markets 11.8 Bundling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 11.9 Wrap-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 AdditionalExercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 12 Nonlinear Pricing 199 12.1 Motivationandobjectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 12.2 Perfectpricediscrimination,revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 12.3 Moreonnonlinearpricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 12.4 Anexampleofnonlinearpricingasscreening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 12.5 Two-parttariffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 12.6 “Degrees”ofpricediscrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 AdditionalExercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 13 Static Games and Nash Equilibrium 211 13.1 Motivesandobjectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 13.2 Players,actions,andtiming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 13.3 Payoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 13.4 Dominantstrategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 13.5 Bestresponses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 13.6 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 13.7 Wrap-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 14 Imperfect Competition 229 14.1 Motivationandobjectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 14.2 Pricecompetition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 14.3 Pricecompetitionwithperfectsubstitutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 14.4 Cournotmodel: Quantitycompetition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 14.5 Quantityvs.pricecompetition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 14.6 Imperfectcompetitionwithfreeentry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 14.7 Wrap-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 15 Explicit and Implicit Cooperation 245 15.1 Motivationandobjectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 15.2 Positiveandnegativeexternalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 15.3 Individualvs.collectiveaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 15.4 Achievingcooperationthroughrepeatedinteraction . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 15.5 Wrap-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 16 Strategic Commitment 255 16.1 Motivesandobjectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 16.2 Sequentialgames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 16.3 Stackelberggames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 16.4 Stackelberggameswithnumericalactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
Table of Contents v 16.5 ComparisonsbetweenNashandStackelberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 16.6 Examplesusingthebasicprinciples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268 16.7 Strategiccommitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 16.8 Wrap-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Page 1 and 2: Firms, Prices, And Markets Timothy
Page 3 and 4: Table of Contents Math Review 1 M.1
Page 5: Table of Contents iii 7 Pricing wit
Page 11 and 12: M.1 What math? Math Review Microeco
Page 13 and 14: Section 3 Graphs 3 M.3 Graphs To gr
Page 15 and 16: Section 4 Inverse of a function 5 f
Page 17 and 18: Section 6 Some nonlinear functions
Page 19 and 20: Section 8 Slope of a nonlinear func
Page 21 and 22: Preliminaries Analytic Methods for
Page 23 and 24: Section 2 The economist’s notion
Page 25 and 26: Section 4 Decomposition of decision
Page 27 and 28: Section 5 Marginal analysis 17 Marg
Page 29 and 30: Section 5 Marginal analysis 19 •
Page 31 and 32: Section 6 The mathematics of margin
Page 33 and 34: Section 7 Wrap-up 23 Observe that a
Page 35 and 36: 1.1 Motives and objectives Broadly
Page 37 and 38: Section 3 Valuation, cost, and surp
Page 39 and 40: Section 5 Many buyers and many sell
Page 43 and 44: Section 6 Very many buyers and very
Page 45 and 46: Section 8 Wrap-up 35 1.8 Wrap-up Th
Page 47 and 48: Chapter 2 Supply, Demand, and Marke
Page 51 and 52: Section 4 Demand and supply: Graphi
Page 53 and 54: Section 5 Consumer and producer sur
Page 55 and 56: Section 6 Gains from trade in equil
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Section7 Changesincostsorvaluations
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Section7 Changesincostsorvaluations
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Section 8 Taxes on transaction 51 s
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Section 9 Wrap-up 53 ation curve (m
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Additional exercises 55 Exercise 2.
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Chapter 3 Consumer Choice and Deman
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Section 3 A model of consumer choic
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Section 4 Interpretation of demand
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Section 4 Interpretation of demand
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Section 5 Wrap-up 65 Linear and log
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Chapter 4 Production and Costs 4.1
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Section 3 What to include in the co
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Section 3 What to include in the co
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Section 4 Economies of scale 73 Sou
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Section 5 A typical cost curve 75 M
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Section 6 When are fixed costs impo
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Section 6 When are fixed costs impo
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Section 7 Pitfalls to avoid regardi
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Section 8 The leading examples of c
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Additional exercises 91 Additional
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94 Competitive Supply and Market Pr
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100 Competitive Supply and Market P
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114 Short-Run Costs and Prices Chap
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Chapter 7 Pricing with Market Power
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Section 3 Profit-maximizing output
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Section 3 Profit-maximizing output
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Section 4 Profit maximization versu
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Section 5 The effect of a long-run
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Additional exercises 145 produces l
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Chapter 8 Elasticity of Demand 8.1
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Section 2 Measuring elasticity 149
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Section 4 Elasticity of special dem
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Section 4 Elasticity of special dem
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Section 6 Wrap-up 155 For example,
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Chapter 9 How Pricing Depends on th
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Section 3 Marginal revenue and elas
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Section 4 The effect of an increase
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Section 5 The price-sensitivity eff
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Section 6 The volume effect 165 Alt
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Section 8 Wrap-up 167 The shift in
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Additional exercises 169 Figure E9.
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172 Explicit Price Discrimination C
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180 Implicit Price Discrimination (
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200 Nonlinear Pricing Chapter 12 On
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202 Nonlinear Pricing Chapter 12 tw
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204 Nonlinear Pricing Chapter 12 fu
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206 Nonlinear Pricing Chapter 12 We
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208 Nonlinear Pricing Chapter 12 Fi
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210 Nonlinear Pricing Chapter 12
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212 Static Games and Nash Equilibri
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230 Imperfect Competition Chapter 1
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Chapter 15 Explicit and Implicit Co
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Section 3 Individual vs. collective
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Section 3 Individual vs. collective
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Section 4 Achieving cooperation thr
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Section 5 Wrap-up 253 of a social n
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256 Strategic Commitment Chapter 16
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Timothy Van Zandt - Insead

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