A Critique of Pure (Genetic) Information

4 Chapter 1
The Phylogenetic Turn and the History of Ontogeny
Although continuous with one long-standing tradition, the rise of the
gene concept marks a radical break with another. For over 2000 years,
from Aristotle through the nineteenth century, the living organism within
the confines of its own life span had been at the center of naturalistic
understanding and explanation. I will refer to a radical shift of perspective,
which begins neither with Darwin nor with Mendel (although the
work of both are contributing factors) but very early in the twentieth
century, as the “phylogenetic turn.” The intent of this phrase is to highlight
the idea that as the gene and genetic program became understood
to be the principal means by which adapted form is acquired, the theater
of adaptation changed from that of individual life histories, that is,
ontogenies, to that of populations over multiple generations, that is,
phylogenies. As the genetic program moved to the explanatory center
stage, the individual organism, with its own adaptive capacities, began
to recede from view.
To adequately clarify and critically consider current usage of the word
the “gene” we must locate it, as well as the associated assumptions of
the phylogenetic turn in this larger context of the history of western
efforts to reconcile the tension between the experiences of nature as
simple physical matter and as organized life-forms. And to begin to
do this we must start by exposing a shibboleth of recent philosophy of
biology. 1 The shibboleth I have in mind is one that evokes the menace of
creationism and insinuates that there have been only two basic organizing
principles in the study of life: that of Darwinian evolution and that
of creationism. Espousals of this sort continue to be ubiquitous in the
philosophy of biological literature. A recent article concerned with the
concepts of function and adaptation suggested that “originally, teleology
was controversial because it was associated with pre-Darwinian
creationist views about organisms” (Allen and Bekoff 1998). Now, in
fact, the teleology of Aristotle as well as that of Immanuel Kant have
both played extremely important roles in the history and advancement
of our understanding of life, and dismissing them with the label “creationism”
is not only misguided but also markedly misleading. It serves
to create an arbitrary boundary beyond which many good neo-