Government Policy and the Nonprofit Sector: Switzerland - VMI

Nollert and Budowski Government Policy and the Nonprofit Sector: Switzerland
The importance and political influence of the NPO sector in Swiss politics is tied to the general weakness of the
state bureaucracy. One indication of the weakness of the state bureaucracy is that most members of Parliament
are strongly affiliated with interest groups (supervisory boards of enterprises, employers’ organizations, trade
unions). A second indication is that public servants and members of the Parliament often depend on external
expertise provided by interest groups. A further indication is that the comparatively few strikes, high
protectoral tariffs, and large agricultural subsidies are due in particular to special interest politics of associations
and not to activities of public authorities.
The low level of conflict amongst the workforce can be traced back to the so‐called “peace agreement” of 1937
in the Swiss metalwork and machine industry. Against the background of threatening fascist Axis powers, the
National Council and the president of the Swiss Metalwork and Watch Industry Workers Federation (SMUV) 8 ,
Konrad Ilg, proposed to the president of the Federation of Swiss Metalwork and Machine Industrialists (ASM) 9
abstention from militant action under certain conditions. One condition was that central disputes be evaluated
and resolved by a neutral arbitration board according to a “good faith” effort (Humbel 1987). This model of
social partnership became the collective labor agreement 10 , a sector‐by‐sector agreement between trade unions
and employers regarding working conditions, pay and hours. This agreement continued after the war and
became codified in the 1974 collective labor agreement (Armingeon et al., 2000, Fluder et al., 1991, 1996).
The NPOs’ strong influence is further institutionalized in some of the instruments of direct democracy: the
referendum, the initiative, as well as the consultation process (see section III.a and Linder 1999). If a qualified
number of citizens disagree with proposed legislation, Swiss law requires it to be subject to a referendum.
Consequently legislators try to incorporate as many NPOs as possible at the consultation stage of policy‐making
in order to avoid this happening too frequently (see section III.a). NPOs can also force votes on extra‐
parliamentary proposals via initiatives.
3. The Philosophy and Principles Behind Swiss Policy
The Swiss government’s policy with regard to nonprofit organizations is fundamentally based on the subsidiarity
principle (Latin: subsidum = assistance). Article 5a of the Federal Constitution explicitly states: “The principle of
subsidiarity is to be observed in the allocation and implementation of public functions.” According to this
principle the state should only carry out activities and resolve problems when no other social actor subordinate
to the Swiss Government can be found to take responsibility, such as municipalities, cantons, families and
commercial or nonprofit companies.
In Switzerland the subsidiarity principle has two philosophical origins; these are evident in the differences
between the manifestos of the Liberal and Catholic parties. The liberal subsidiarity principle supports the
assumption that individuals are responsible for their own lives and their own protection against risk. The state
therefore interferes only when the individual’s resources and those of its primary social networks are
insufficient.
8
Schweizerischer Metall‐ und Uhrenarbeiterverband
9
Arbeitgeberverband schweizerischer Maschinen‐ und Metallindustrieller
10
Der Gesamtarbeitsvertrag, GAV
4