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Sequentielle Verteilungsspiele

Sequentielle Verteilungsspiele

Sequentielle Verteilungsspiele

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24 ECONOMIC INQUIRY<br />

Ergebnisse FIGURE 2<br />

TABLE 1<br />

24<br />

Rejection Rate of the (8/2)-Offer<br />

across Games<br />

ECONOMIC INQUIRY<br />

Expected Payoffs for the Proposers<br />

from Different Offers<br />

FIGURE 2<br />

Expected ExpectedTABLE payoff Percentage 1<br />

Rejection Rate of the (8/2)-Offer<br />

payoff Expected of of thePayoffs alternative for of the(8/2)-<br />

Proposers<br />

across Games Game the 8/2-offer fromoffer Differentproposals<br />

Offers<br />

(5/5)-game 4.44 Expected 5.00 Expected31payoff Percentage<br />

(2/8)-game 5.87 payoff 1.96 of of the alternative 73 of (8/2)-<br />

(10/0)-game<br />

Game<br />

7.29<br />

the 8/2-offer<br />

1.11<br />

offer<br />

100<br />

proposals<br />

(5/5)-game 4.44 5.00 31<br />

(2/8)-game 5.87 1.96 73<br />

the rejection rate from 18% to roughly 45%<br />

(10/0)-game 7.29 1.11 100<br />

in the (5/5)-game suggests that intentionsdriven<br />

punishment behavior is a major factor.<br />

Thus, ithe seems rejection that reciprocity rate from 18% is actually to roughly 45%<br />

driven by both in the outcomes (5/5)-game and intentions. suggests that intentionsdriven<br />

we takepunishment a look at the behavior proposers’ is a major fac-<br />

Finally,<br />

(4 subjects) in the (10/0)-game. 7 The nonparametric<br />

Cochran Q-test confirms that the<br />

tor. Thus, the varying it seemsacceptance that reciprocity rate is actually<br />

behavior. Given<br />

of the (8/2)-offer<br />

differences in rejection rates across the four<br />

driven by theboth expected outcomes return andfrom<br />

intentions.<br />

Je günstiger die Alternative für denthis Responder, offer also<br />

games are significant (p < 0001). It also<br />

Finally, varied desto we across take weniger games. a lookTable zufrieden at the1<br />

proposers’ ist<br />

(4 subjects) in the (10/0)-game. 7 The shows non-thaparametric 2) the difference between the<br />

behavior. Given the varying acceptance rate<br />

it was least profitable to propose<br />

confirms er mit (8, that Cochran Q-test confirms that (8/2) the in the (5/5)-game and most profitable in<br />

(5/5)-game and the other three games is<br />

of the (8/2)-offer the expected return from<br />

differences in rejection rates across the the four (10/0)-game. The expected payoff of the<br />

statistically Es geht significant also nicht (p < nur 0001). umPair-wise<br />

Auszahlungen this offer also varied across games. Table 1<br />

games are significant (p < 0001). It alternative also offers exhibits the reverse order.<br />

comparisons that rejection rate<br />

shows that it was least profitable 8<br />

to propose<br />

FFF: Scheinbar confirms that interpretieren the difference die between Spieler Thisthe<br />

indicates u.a. that given the rejection behavior<br />

ofisthe responders, the payoff-maximizing<br />

in the (5/5)-game is significantly higher than<br />

(8/2)<br />

die<br />

in the<br />

Intention<br />

(5/5)-gamedes and most<br />

Proposers<br />

profitable in<br />

(5/5)-game and the other three games<br />

in (Wählt the (2/8)-game statistically<br />

er (8,(p 2) = significant<br />

aus 017, Freundlichkeit two-sided) (p < 0001). and Pair-wise<br />

oder aus the Egoismus?)<br />

(10/0)-game. The expected payoff of the<br />

choice is (5/5) in the (5/5)-game, (8/2) in the<br />

that the difference comparisons between confirm the that (2/8)- theand<br />

alternative offers exhibits the reverse order.<br />

rejection (2/8)-game, rate<br />

8<br />

and also (8/2) in the (10/0)-game.<br />

the (10/0)-game in the is(5/5)-game also highly is significantly (p =<br />

This indicates that given the rejection behavior<br />

of the responders, the payoff-maximizing<br />

higher The than last column in Table 1 shows that the<br />

017, two-sided). in the The (2/8)-game difference (p between = 017, two-sided) the<br />

vastand<br />

majority of the proposers made indeed<br />

(2/8)- and that the (8/2)-game the difference is, however, between only<br />

choice is (5/5) in the (5/5)-game, (8/2) in the<br />

the (2/8)- theand<br />

payoff-maximizing choice in each game.<br />

(weakly) significant if one is willing to apply<br />

(2/8)-game, and also (8/2) in the (10/0)-game.<br />

9<br />

the (10/0)-game is also highly significant Although (p = this proposer behavior is consistentthe<br />

with the assumption that the majority<br />

a one-sided017, test two-sided). (p = 068, The one-sided). difference The<br />

The last column in Table 1 shows that the<br />

between<br />

difference between the (8/2)- and the (10/0)-<br />

vast majority of the proposers made indeed<br />

Ablehnungswahrscheinlichkeit von (8, 2) hängt am Wert der Alternative<br />

(8, 2) wird auch abgelehnt, wenn die Alternative (8, 2) ist – reine U-Aversion<br />

Ähnliche Ergebnisse in Brandts and Sola (2001, GEB). Aber . . .

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