Twenty-Five Years of Batson: An Introduction to ... - University of Iowa
Twenty-Five Years of Batson: An Introduction to ... - University of Iowa
Twenty-Five Years of Batson: An Introduction to ... - University of Iowa
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2012] TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF BATSON 1413<br />
indication that the reason provided was “a pretext for racial<br />
discrimination.” 167 However, if a trial judge, taking in<strong>to</strong> account “the<br />
demeanor <strong>of</strong> the at<strong>to</strong>rney who exercise[d] the challenge,” believes the “raceneutral<br />
explanation” <strong>of</strong>fered, that “finding <strong>of</strong> fact” is entitled <strong>to</strong> “great<br />
deference on appeal.” 168 Reversal is appropriate only if the “finding on the<br />
issue <strong>of</strong> discrimina<strong>to</strong>ry intent . . . was clearly erroneous.” 169 In Hernandez, the<br />
judge did not commit clear error. 170<br />
Hernandez created some ambiguity about the meaning <strong>of</strong> “race neutral.”<br />
The plurality opinion declined <strong>to</strong> decide how broadly “the concept <strong>of</strong> race<br />
should be defined.” 171 Justice Kennedy did suggest that some reasons could<br />
be so associated with race that they “should be treated as . . . surrogate[s] for<br />
race under an equal protection analysis.” 172 Whether such surrogates exist<br />
remains unresolved.<br />
Four years later, Purkett v. Elem clarified a point implicit in Hernandez. 173<br />
The defendant challenged a prosecu<strong>to</strong>r’s strikes <strong>of</strong> two black men during<br />
jury selection for his robbery trial. 174 The prosecu<strong>to</strong>r explained that he<br />
struck the jurors based on hair length, facial hair, and the fact that one <strong>of</strong><br />
them had a shotgun pointed at him during a robbery. 175 The state courts<br />
rejected the defendant’s objection, 176 but in a subsequent habeas corpus<br />
proceeding, the Eighth Circuit concluded that <strong>Batson</strong>’s step two required a<br />
plausible explanation <strong>of</strong> how reasons that are facially irrelevant <strong>to</strong> a juror’s<br />
ability <strong>to</strong> serve in a case might affect the juror’s performance. 177 The court<br />
deemed the hair-length and facial-hair reasons “pretextual” and found clear<br />
167. Id.<br />
168. Id. at 364–65.<br />
169. Id. at 369.<br />
170. Id. at 369–70.<br />
171. Id. at 371. Whether Spanish-speaking ability was race-neutral did not have <strong>to</strong> be<br />
decided because the prosecu<strong>to</strong>r did not strike jurors on that ground. See id. at 360, 371.<br />
172. Id. at 371 (“It may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>iciency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for<br />
race . . . .”). Justices O’Connor and Scalia would have foreclosed the possibility <strong>of</strong> “surrogates”<br />
for race. In their view, the only reason that cannot rebut a prima facie case is race. <strong>Batson</strong> “does<br />
not require that the justification be unrelated <strong>to</strong> race” but “only that the . . . reason for striking<br />
a juror not be the juror’s race.” Id. at 375 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). It seems<br />
likely that the three dissenters would have agreed that some reasons might be disqualified as<br />
“surrogates” for race. See id. at 375 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 375–79 (Stevens, J.,<br />
dissenting).<br />
173. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam).<br />
174. Id. at 766.<br />
175. Id.<br />
176. Id.<br />
177. Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1994), rev’d, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).