Twenty-Five Years of Batson: An Introduction to ... - University of Iowa

More documents

Recommendations

Info

1420 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1393 avoid the need for a penalty phase. 234 Because there were “two explanations for the strike” and the judge “made [no] determination concerning [the juror’s] demeanor,” the Justices refused to “presume” that he “credited the prosecutor’s assertion that [the juror] was nervous.” 235 The majority then concluded that the trial judge’s determination that the juror’s “student-teaching obligation” was the actual reason for striking him was clear error. 236 Fifty venire members had expressed concern about “obligations.” 237 In addition, the prosecutor’s supposed apprehension about the struck juror’s inclination to shorten the proceedings with a lesser verdict was “highly speculative.” 238 “The implausibility of this explanation [was] reinforced by the prosecutor’s acceptance of white jurors” with “conflicting obligations that” were equally “serious.” 239 As in Miller-El, “[t]he prosecution’s . . . pretextual explanation naturally [gave] rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” 240 It indicated an effort to conceal the real reason for removing the juror—his race. A step-three determination of intent requires the judge to consider “all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity.” 241 The totality of relevant facts in Snyder made it clearly erroneous for the trial judge not to find intentional race discrimination. 242 Together, Snyder and Miller-El warn trial courts not to reflexively accept neutral rebuttal reasons, instruct them to conscientiously review all the pertinent evidence, and direct them to sustain Batson claims when that evidence shows a proffered explanation to be implausible, false, and pretextual. They remind reviewing courts that deference to trial court findings is not boundless and that failures to find discrimination when the evidence is clear can and must be overturned. 243 Miller-El and Snyder corrected rulings that were insufficiently protective of Batson’s values. The final two Batson progeny reversed appellate rulings that infringed upon the fact-finding prerogatives of trial judges. Neither involved a capital offense, and both reached the Supreme Court after 234. Id. 235. Id. at 479. 236. Id. 237. Id. at 480. 238. Id. at 482. 239. Id. at 483. 240. Id. at 485. 241. Id. at 478. 242. The Snyder Court reserved a “causation” question—whether the proponent of a strike who acted with discriminatory intent may nevertheless prevail by showing that if she had not had a forbidden purpose she would have struck the juror for a valid reason. Id. at 485–86. 243. Because these two cases involved death sentences, trial and appellate courts might conclude that they need be vigilant only in capital cases. Nothing in the opinions, however, suggests that the analysis should be different in noncapital trials. See id. passim; Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
2012] TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF BATSON 1421 appellate judges had reviewed district court denials of habeas corpus petitions based on Batson claims. In both, the Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit erred in failing to accord state courts the deference owed to step-three fact determinations. In Rice v. Collins, the defendant challenged the strike of a single black juror. 244 The prosecution explained that the juror had “rolled her eyes,” that she “was young and might be too tolerant of a drug crime,” and that she was “single and lacked ties to the community.” 245 The trial judge ruled that the juror’s youthfulness was a sufficient explanation. 246 The state appellate court affirmed, finding both the “youth” and “demeanor” reasons to be legitimate and supportive of the strike. 247 After a federal district judge denied habeas relief, the Ninth Circuit reversed. 248 On appeal, all nine Justices tersely concluded that the Ninth Circuit had “improperly substituted its evaluation of the record for that of the state trial court.” 249 The habeas statute allowed relief only if the state court “made an unreasonable factual determination.” 250 Consequently, the issue was whether the trial court’s “credibility determination”—i.e., the decision “to accept the prosecutor’s explanation” that it had struck the juror due to “her youth and her demeanor”—”was unreasonable.” 251 The Court concluded that it was not. The juror’s indication that she believed the crime charged should be illegal and her affirmation of impartiality did not mean that the government’s concern that she might be “too tolerant of the crime” was “a pretext.” 252 There may have been “reason to question the prosecutor’s credibility,” but because “[r]easonable minds . . . might disagree” on that issue, it was “permissible” for the judge to accept the prosecutor’s explanation and reject the Batson claim. 253 Felkner v. Jackson proved even easier. 254 The defendant objected to the removal of two black jurors. 255 According to the prosecutor, he struck one because he asserted that he had frequently been stopped by police based on “his race and age” and might have “animosity.” 256 He struck the other 244. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 336 (2006). 245. Id. The prosecutor had also referred to the juror’s gender and “[t]he trial court, correctly, disallowed any reliance on that ground.” Id. 246. Id. at 336–37. 247. Id. at 337. 248. Id. 249. Id. at 337–38. 250. Id. at 339. 251. Id. 252. Id. at 341. 253. Id. at 341–42. 254. Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305 (2011) (per curiam). 255. Id. at 1306. 256. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted from second quotation).
Page 1 and 2: Twenty-Five Years of Batson: An Int
Page 3 and 4: 2012] TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF BATSON 1
Page 27: 2012] TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF BATSON 1
Page 31: 2012] TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF BATSON 1

Twenty-Five Years of Batson: An Introduction to ... - University of Iowa

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?