Twenty-Five Years of Batson: An Introduction to ... - University of Iowa

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1422 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1393 because of her “degree in social work” and her internship “at the county jail.” 257 The trial court sustained the strikes. 258 The defendant appealed, relying on “a comparative juror analysis” and claiming that differential treatment proved that the “explanations were pretextual.” 259 The state appellate court affirmed, explaining how another juror’s experience with law enforcement was “not comparable” to that of the struck juror and opining that the differential questioning could be explained by the struck juror’s “social services background,” which was distinguishable from other jurors’ backgrounds in other disciplines. 260 A federal district judge denied habeas relief because the State’s stepthree fact determination was not unreasonable. 261 The Ninth Circuit supported its decision to reverse with one sentence, stating that “[t]he prosecutor’s proffered race-neutral bases . . . were not sufficient to counter the evidence of purposeful discrimination in light of the fact that two out of three prospective African–American jurors were stricken, and the record reflected different treatment of comparably situated jurors.” 262 A unanimous Supreme Court deemed the reversal “as inexplicable as it is unexplained,” concluding that the court of appeals had not accorded the state court the deference required by habeas statutes. 263 The state appellate court’s “decision” to uphold the trial court’s credibility determination “was plainly not unreasonable,” and “[t]here was simply no basis for the [court of appeals] to reach the opposite conclusion.” 264 Although both Collins and Felkner were habeas petitions that demanded even greater deference, the Court surely would have reached the same conclusion if it had been reviewing reversals on direct appeals. Appellate determinations that trial judges had clearly erred in accepting prosecutors’ explanations would have been indefensible. These two opinions admonish appellate courts not to intervene excessively in determinations of discriminatory intent. In most cases, credibility determinations should be sustained, not second-guessed. Miller-El and Snyder were exceptional 257. Id. 258. Id. 259. Id. He argued that “a non-black juror . . . [who] had negative experiences with law enforcement” was not struck and that the prosecutor had “asked follow-up questions of several white jurors when . . . concerned about their educational backgrounds, but struck [the black juror] without asking her any questions about her degree in social work.” Id. 260. Id. at 1307 (internal quotation marks omitted from first quotation). Moreover, the prosecutor had “focused on [the struck juror’s] internship experience at the county jail.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 261. Id. 262. Id. (quoting Felkner v. Jackson, 389 F. App’x 640, 641 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 263. Id. 264. Id.
2012] TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF BATSON 1423 situations requiring intervention. They were not the norm and were worlds apart from cases like Collins and Felkner. The Court issued Felkner, its most recent Batson decision, in March 2011, just over a month before Batson’s twenty-fifth anniversary. During that quarter of a century, the Court has devoted considerable attention to Batson’s scope, expanding it substantially before indicating that there is little, if any, additional room for growth. The Court has also proclaimed fidelity to Batson’s three-step framework, rejecting an overly demanding standard for prima facie case assessments, minimizing the potency of the rebuttal demand, and focusing attention on the nature of the fact determination required by step three. In addition, the Court has emphasized that determinations of discriminatory purpose deserve great deference on appeal and in collateral challenges to convictions. It has punctuated the need for deference by unanimously reversing inappropriate appellate interventions. On the other hand, the Court’s interventions in extreme cases, where findings of no discriminatory purpose were irreconcilable with the evidence, made it clear that deference is not absolute and that such findings cannot stand when they are incompatible with Batson’s spirit and objectives. III. CONCLUSION Batson’s revolutionary reform of the relationship between peremptory challenges and the guarantee of equal protection was a milestone. The proclamation that discrimination in the courtroom is intolerable and the announcement that previously immune decisions to strike jurors are subject to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny and regulation were symbolically and pragmatically significant. Developments during the years since Batson have sent mixed messages. The Court has expanded Batson’s reach while diluting the doctrinal demand that parties justify questionable decisions to exclude jurors. The decisions reflect a belief that trial judges are capable of identifying discriminatory exclusion of jurors and a trust (or perhaps a hope) that they are committed to preventing it. They instruct appellate courts not to tread on the generous discretion entrusted to trial judges but to correct clear failures to enforce Batson. This introductory Essay has described the pre-Batson landscape, documented Batson’s dramatic modifications, and chronicled the major events during Batson’s first twenty-five years. An array of insightful and provocative essays follows. The authors’ fascinating perspectives and reflections upon the landmark and its legacy are a most appropriate celebration of its silver anniversary.
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Twenty-Five Years of Batson: An Introduction to ... - University of Iowa

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