Twenty-Five Years of Batson: An Introduction to ... - University of Iowa

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1394 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1393 On April 30, 2011, Batson v. Kentucky celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary. Although not every member of the Supreme Court is convinced of Batson’s merits, 1 there is no movement afoot to overturn or dramatically modify it. A solid majority remains committed to the principles of Batson and its progeny and to the doctrinal framework that gives concrete content to Equal Protection Clause regulation of peremptory jury challenges. While the Court cannot always ensure faithful implementation of Batson, in recent years the Justices have intervened when lower courts have been unfaithful to the spirit of that landmark ruling. 2 The Court has confronted Batson issues on several occasions since 1986. Some opinions have resolved significant questions about the breadth of Fourteenth Amendment constraints upon peremptory challenges. 3 Others have involved efforts to prescribe the content of Batson’s doctrinal framework with greater precision. 4 Still others have revolved entirely around the correct application of the Batson doctrine to particular fact situations. 5 The twenty-fifth anniversary of Batson is a fitting occasion for serious evaluation of both Batson and its descendants. This symposium’s goals are to document the landmark’s current status, to monitor its vitality, to assess its impacts, and to reflect upon its future. The essays that follow ably accomplish these goals. Indeed, the authors have provided an impressive array of insights into and evaluations of Batson and a number of provocative critiques of its significance and efficacy. This introductory Essay serves as a primer. The primary objective is to furnish a foundation for the analyses that follow. Part I describes the law prior to 1986 and documents how Batson dramatically altered the legal landscape, highlighting noteworthy facets of the Batson decision. Part II surveys and summarizes post-Batson developments. Part III concludes. 1. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 60–62 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 425–26, 429–30 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 2. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). 3. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that gender-based strikes are unconstitutional); McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (extending Batson doctrine to defense peremptories); Powers, 499 U.S. 400 (concluding that defendant may raise equal protection challenge to peremptory strikes of jurors of a different race). 4. See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 5. See Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305 (2011); Snyder, 552 U.S. 472; Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322.
2012] TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF BATSON 1395 I. FROM STRAUDER TO SWAIN TO BATSON: THE EQUAL PROTECTION PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATORY JUROR SELECTION The Supreme Court found roots for Batson in a number of its prior decisions. The two most significant precedents were Strauder v. West Virginia 6 and Swain v. Alabama. 7 This section summarizes those two opinions, explains Batson’s holding, and explores its premises. A. STRAUDER V. WEST VIRGINIA: STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR ALL-WHITE VENIRES AND EQUAL PROTECTION Strauder v. West Virginia—decided more than a century before Batson— involved a state statute providing that only “white male persons” were eligible “to serve as jurors.” 8 Strauder, a black man indicted for murder by an all-white, all-male grand jury, moved “to quash the venire,” asserting that the preclusion of blacks from jury service “was unconstitutional.” 9 After the trial court overruled this motion, an all-male, all-white jury convicted Strauder, and the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. 10 The question before the Supreme Court was whether, under “the Constitution and laws of the United States, every citizen . . . has a right to a trial of an indictment against him by a jury selected and impanelled without discrimination against his race or color, because of race or color.” 11 More specifically, the issue was “whether, in the composition or selection of jurors . . . all persons of [a colored man’s] race or color may be excluded by law, solely because of their race or color, so that by no possibility can any colored man sit upon the jury.” 12 The Justices found guidance in the recently adopted Fourteenth Amendment command “that no State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” 13 According to Strauder, the “purpose” of the Equal Protection Clause was to “secur[e] to a race recently emancipated . . . all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy.” 14 Its “spirit and meaning” was, quite simply, that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race . . . 6. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 7. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1985). 8. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305 (quoting 1873 W. Va. Acts 102). 9. Id. at 304–05 (quoting Strauder’s motions to quash the venire). 10. Id. at 305. 11. Id. 12. Id. 13. Id. at 307. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, just eleven years before Strauder. 14. Id. at 306.
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