Marine Occurrence report 232 - Australian Transport Safety Bureau

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Figure 16: Port Hedland hydrographic survey data showing the deep water pocket and Creciente’s grounding position Approximate 18 m contour line Creciente’s grounded position Creciente almost certainly touched the bottom twice. The first occasion was just after the breakaway, when the ship made brief contact with the side of the channel. The second grounding occurred at about 0515 when the ship grounded in the Port Hedland harbour channel, close to beacon number 46. 2.4 Risk Management Creciente had berthed without incident at the Nelson Point iron ore berths in Port Hedland on several previous occasions. On each occasion, the ship had used the same configuration of 16 mooring lines that were tended as required by the duty seaman. This was the first time that the ship had berthed at Finucane Island berth D. The pilot informed the master of the seven metre tidal range associated with the spring tides and of the strong tidal flow that could be expected at the berth. The pilot also informed the master that the Port Hedland Port Authority (PHPA) required cape-sized ships berthed in Port Hedland to use 16 mooring lines and tend them regularly. No other mooring requirements were placed on the ship and these mooring requirements did not specifically identify the risks associated with mooring ships in the particularly strong tidal flow at Finucane Island berth D or the risk of a breakaway. Consequently, PHPA did not specify sufficient safeguards to reduce the risk of a fully laden ship breaking away from this berth in a full ebb tidal flow. Creciente’s crew had tended the ship’s mooring lines throughout the previous 24 hours, while the ship had been affected by the high spring tides. This experience should have highlighted to them the difficulties and risks associated with a single seaman tending the lines through the night. Neither ship’s master nor the duty - 23 -
officers considered these issues and so, consequently, no action was taken to increase the manpower available for the task or to increase the frequency of tending the lines. Creciente’s safety management system documentation did not include any guidance or procedures for mooring the ship, for tending the mooring lines or for assessing any risks associated with the task. Without such guidance, Creciente’s crew were not aware of, or did not consider, the reduction in mooring strength associated with the rope layering on the mooring winches. Furthermore, they did not adequately consider the reduction in brake effectiveness due to the corrosion and pitting of the brake drums. Consequently, the risks associated with mooring the ship at a wharf with an expected tidal range of about seven metres were not adequately assessed by the ship’s crew. When the Finucane Island berths were constructed by BHP Billiton, no analysis was undertaken, in conjunction with PHPA, of the impact that a build-up of material under the belts would have on the tidal flow or the effects of tidal forces on the ships that would use the berths. While ships have safely used these berths, anecdotal accounts from pilots berthing ships at them suggests that these berths are particularly susceptible to the effects of tidal forces. The PHPA has a port emergency plan that states that it intends to cover foreseeable incidents and outlines remedial action but it is not designed to cover every eventuality 11 . The port emergency plan details the actions to be taken for several types of incidents such as fire and explosion, pollution, collision or stranding of a vessel. The port emergency plan does not list the breakaway of a ship from its mooring as a port emergency although an uncontrolled breakaway and the resultant blockage of the main shipping channel would constitute a significant port emergency. Section C of the port emergency plan details the response to a ‘vessel collision, sinking, stranding or emergency situation in Port Hedland harbour’. The stated aim of this section of the port emergency plan is to: … ensure, as far as possible, whatever the incident may be, that the dredged channel, turning basin, mooring basins and the recommended track in the approaches to the channel are kept free of obstruction to the safe navigation of vessels. More detailed advice is included in this section of the plan under the heading ‘Action by Pilots’ which states: The pilot’s overriding concern must be to keep the main shipping channel clear either by removing the vessel from the channel as speedily as possible if circumstances allow or by manoeuvring the vessel parallel and close to the channel edge. Every effort must be made to avoid impeding traffic flow and to remember that the port can still function, albeit in a restricted fashion, with channel width reduced to half. Although the port emergency plan implies that if a ship grounds then it is preferable for it to occur, either outside the channel or close to and parallel to the channel edge, so as to not restrict the channel, it is generally preferable for a ship to not ground at all. 11 Port Hedland Port Authority (1999), ‘Port Emergency Plan’, p 3-1. - 24 -
Page 2 and 3: ATSB TRANSPORT SAFETY INVESTIGATION
Page 4 and 5: CONTENTS DOCUMENT RETRIEVAL INFORMA
Page 6 and 7: DOCUMENT RETRIEVAL INFORMATION Repo
Page 8 and 9: THE AUSTRALIAN TRANSPORT SAFETY BUR
Page 10 and 11: ATSB INVESTIGATION REPORT TERMINOLO
Page 12 and 13: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY On 8 September 20
Page 14 and 15: 1 FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1 Creciente
Page 16 and 17: Each mooring winch consists of two
Page 18 and 19: 1.2.1 Tidal flow A drying sand spit
Page 20 and 21: Figure 7: Normal mooring arrangemen
Page 22 and 23: The second mate walked aft, along t
Page 24 and 25: Figure 10: Creciente aground in Por
Page 26 and 27: 2 ANALYSIS 2.1 Evidence On 15 and 1
Page 28 and 29: holding capacity of the ship’s wi
Page 30 and 31: ake’s strongest holding direction
Page 32 and 33: move off the wharf and this resulte
Page 34 and 35: The spring tides in Port Hedland ar
Page 38 and 39: While the port emergency plan did n
Page 40 and 41: 3 FINDINGS 3.1 Context At about 024
Page 42 and 43: 4 SAFETY ACTIONS 4.1 Safety action
Page 44 and 45: APPENDIX A: EVENTS AND CONDITIONS -
Page 46 and 47: APPENDIX B: SHIP INFORMATION Crecie
Page 48 and 49: APPENDIX C: SOURCES AND SUBMISSIONS

Marine Occurrence report 232 - Australian Transport Safety Bureau

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