Practical Sustainment Concepts for the Non-Linear Battlespace

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an understanding in both networks that a high degree of visibility and control is required high up in the hierarchical chain (at servers or in the SB), in order to locate the service or the information and push it where it is required. Ownership of the nodes Another consideration for comparing the various levels of nodes is the responsibility for node management. Typically, a single organization should have overall command of a given point on the ground in order to facilitate defence planning and coordination. However, it could be argued that node command responsibility should be matched to the nature of the effort required for node management. In the case of a leaguer or SP, for example, node management is predominated by force protection and security. The commanding organization would arguably be combat arms, as they retain the expertise for protection and security tasks. On the other hand, node management activities in a FOB or a camp could be largely predominated by service support issues (garbage removal, toilets, showers, food services, etc.). The more complex infrastructure requires attention that could eventually exceed the effort required for force protection. Consequently, it would be logical that the overall commanding organization be a sustainment one. Figure 8: A comparison of the ratio of management effort between sustainment and force protection activities for three levels of tactical infrastructure. During OP ARCHER R4, this was largely true. The command of KAF, at least the Canadian portion, was an NSE responsibility, including even the management of the force protection elements. The command of leaguers, SP and PB remains with the manoeuvre units. Contention arose during discussions about the command of FOBs and Camps, which was originally assigned to the Battle Group (BG) and the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). This had the negative effect of fixing the sub-unit headquarters to the ground to manage largely sustainment issues. Company Sergeants-Major, as Camp SM, had to invest time and effort on sewage and garbage issues in lieu of concentrating their efforts on the support of the next operation. At one point, the BG CO made a request to the NSE CO, to please take the FOBs, alluding that the NSE take ownership and command of both sustainment issues and force protection of each FOB, and be allocated resources accordingly. The BG companies would then only be tenants on the FOB, until deploying on the next operation. However, despite efforts to liberate the command and control and administrative resources required, the NSE organization was not sufficiently endowed to take on such a task. In the end, the manoeuvre units retained the FOBs, and they absorbed the impact on their operations. The Deployable Sustainment Detachment: The A3 On both the linear and non-linear battlefields, there are situations in which sustainment at a given location must be surged in order to support a priority operation. In the linear battlefield, this led to the deployment of the forward logistics group (FLG), 54 Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.2 Summer 2008
which was essentially a task-tailored second line CSS package from the service battalion in the BSA. In the example in Figure 9, a break in sustainment flow between the BSA and A2 echelons requires the deployment of the FLG onto the admin coy echelon in order to complement the support in that location. The FLG remains an unbreakable entity and separate to the supported organization, and technicians conduct levels of support concurrent with the second line. It should be noted, the technicians would be generally unfamiliar with the A2/A1 environment, as well as the personnel in the Admin Coy. Figure 9: The Deployment of the FLG in the Linear Battlespace. Yellow denotes elements belonging to the service battalion, and green denotes elements belonging to the manoeuvre element (i.e., the BG). In the non-linear battlefield, where resources are no longer dedicated to a given line of support, the FLG concept does not exist. When a given operation is planned at some distance from existing TI, what is required is not a dedicated second line organization rather a means to project sustainment resources of both 1 st and 2 nd levels. These resources, which may originally be static, must become mobile to support a specific operation over a relatively short time. The A3 is exactly that. A task-tailored organization, including a command and control element, formed from adjacent nodes in order to either reinforce the logistic elements in an existing node or in some temporary one that has been established. Because these resources perform similar sustainment tasks to the supported organization, they can integrate into and reinforce the sustainment concept already in location. The A3 can not only be used to control sustainment elements already with the deploying manoeuvre unit, but will also be used to tap into additional sustainment resources in adjacent nodes as required. As opposed to the A1 and A2, the A3 is not an echelon, but in fact an integration of elements of the sustainment network in the support of a manoeuvre plan. The A3 brings to the manoeuvre commander a capability of sustainment effects, similar to how an artillery forward observation officer (FOO) brings fire support effects. When the manoeuvre commander specifies the effects that he requires the FOO to bring to bear on the target, the FOO coordinates resources either within his battery or by other fire support resources available (reinforcing regiments, attack helicopters, close air support, etc) to achieve that effect. The commander need not concern himself with the manner in which it is delivered. In the same manner, a commander has but to specify to the A3 the sustainment effect desired—a recovery action, a replenishment of manoeuvre elements (e.g., a DP or a Com Pt). The A3 commander provides from either the resources under his tactical command, or by coordinating through Log Ops the application of resources from adjacent sustainment nodes, in order to achieve the effect. The manoeuvre commander need not concern himself with the details. Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.2 Summer 2008 55
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Page 3 and 4: Figure 2: Sustainment tasks as a fu
Page 5 and 6: Figure 4: Sustainment tasks on node
Page 7 and 8: Table 1 further illustrates that th
Page 9: The Hierarchy of Nodes A few observ
Page 13 and 14: for sustainment doctrine will permi
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Practical Sustainment Concepts for the Non-Linear Battlespace

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