Practical Sustainment Concepts for the Non-Linear Battlespace

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number of dedicated IS organizations. It could be said that operations on the left make efficient or economic use of limited resources (quantity “X”), and on the right, the additional resources (quantity “Y”) provide flexibility to manoeuvre commanders making them more effective on the ground. Somewhere between the two extremes, there are solutions that include the attribution of IS organizations to single units on the battlefield, particularly those that have very specific requirements. The construction of a dedicated capability must, however, take into consideration all dependencies with other sustainment nodes. Take the following scenario that we have already seen. Figure 13: The creation of a dedicated IS capability to a unit. The node and link in green now becomes the responsibility of a single manoeuvre unit. Let us presume in this scenario there are elements of all manoeuvre units deployed in each node, as in Afghanistan. If sustainment resources were in sufficient abundance to consider the creation of a dedicated IS capability to the BG, for example, then the employment of these elements could be considered to take on the responsibility of certain links and nodes that were previously under the NSE purview. If we were to consider, for example, the assignment of node and link support for FOB DOG, we would run into an interesting situation for that unit. Indeed, the FOB is also so interdependent with other nodes in the battlespace, so there would be constant requirement for transfer of personnel and materiel between the BG and the NSE, in order to ensure continuous support forward to the smaller infrastructures. However, a reasonable solution would be the BG’s allocation of node and link support for PB CAT because it is fundamentally dependent on a single line of support from the Camp. In surge operations, the NSE will still have the flexibility to reallocate resources from other FOBs. However, the daily sustainment concept will be built on a single link that would be supportable by a BG IS element. There is a catch to this relationship. By taking on the responsibility for the PB, including the kitchen, fuel farm, medical station and supply depot, the BG is also taking on the responsibility for the support of all other lodging units, including the OMLT, PRT, or even resident NSE resources. This poses an interesting dilemma, in which a single unit now has to incorporate in its planning the intentions and limitations of several other units in the task force. Essentially, by taking on the IS element, they are also taking on a staff responsibility at formation level. Consequently, the creation of an IS piece must essentially include more intimate planning and coordination with the higher headquarters and flanking units. A considerable amount of thought has yet to be put into defining the scope of this support concept for a non-contiguous battlespace, as it will ultimately have an effect on the establishment, organization, equipment and training of all elements within the 60 Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.2 Summer 2008
sustainment picture. It will be necessary to look at streamlining the sustainment tasks, because there continue to be many issues with the distribution and optimization of support resources. Conclusion The current Canadian sustainment doctrine, while entirely relevant for the linear battlefield, is based on a number of premises that are no longer applicable in a noncontiguous battlespace such as in Afghanistan. First, the sustainment concept and organizations are based on the ground and its assumed state of security. By virtue of the time and space that are separating deployed elements on the battlefield, sustainment organizations’ tasks, structure and chains of command are separated into specific echelons that vary from the most secure areas of the battlefield, in the rear where increased security permits the development of complex support infrastructure, to the front where mobility and force protection limit the complexity of support possible. Another premise is the availability of sustainment resources that can be dedicated to each echelon, and that every subunit, unit and formation has a dedicated sustainment organization. Finally, sustainment resources themselves are limited to specific, specialized roles according to their organizational assignment. In the non-linear environment of Afghanistan, the battlefield is based not on the ground but on the establishment of secure nodes between which sustainment tasks are shared. Finally, in order to facilitate the efficient use of resources, sustainment is best centralized under a single chain of command. However, in studying the non-linear environment, certain sustainment principles remain valid, including the relationship between security and production and the requirement to preserve the sustainment tasks. In the non-linear battlefield, these tasks break down logically into those performed in nodes and links. It is shown that because the nodes can provide areas of security equivalent to former rear echelons, numerous lines of support can be applied in the same location, by the same resources to multiple units, which increases the requirement for flexibility at both soldier and staff levels. Because links tasks are conducted in insecure areas, they must be treated as deliberate manoeuvre operations and coordinated along the Ops chain. . Central sustainment coordination has become more complex, as Log Ops must literally plan from the operational level all the way down to the individual soldier. Consequently, we see the requirement for planning, intelligence and coordination capabilities where the establishment has yet to develop them.. Sustainment in the non-linear environment is now based on a network concept of support shared between secure nodes. These nodes have a certain hierarchy based on the time and resources available at a given point and a rule of superior node dependency can be established for planning. In this resource-based environment, we have shown that resources can be assigned to separate units, but at the cost of more overall resources and additional coordination at higher levels. This coordination has been shown to be equivalent to that of fire support, as sustainment effects are now as indistinctive as fire effects on a target. The FOO equivalent in the application of these effects is the A3, which can provide punctual augmentation to a sustainment plan in support of a manoeuvre plan. This article is not intended to replace current doctrine, as the linear battlefield model is still highly relevant to those environments. Rather, it seeks to add a non-linear dimension to the current doctrine for those theatres such as Afghanistan, where the linear model fails to describe the support concept. In the future, organizational planning for deployments must consider the environment in which sustainment is to be executed, and tailor the establishment, structure and equipment appropriately. It is hoped that this Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.2 Summer 2008 61
Page 1 and 2: PRACTICAL SUSTAINMENT CONCEPTS FOR
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Page 9 and 10: The Hierarchy of Nodes A few observ
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Practical Sustainment Concepts for the Non-Linear Battlespace

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