Practical Sustainment Concepts for the Non-Linear Battlespace

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Figure 3: The node, immersed in a hotbed of enemy activity (e.g., KAF) The establishment of a single node is essentially the way the Canadian mission in Afghanistan began. In KAF there are elements of every single echelon, all grouped into the same location (the forward mobile support unit (FMSU) meters away from manoeuvre battalions, and the exchange of services that would normally have been done in some DP or equipment collection point (ECP) is conducted in situ). More importantly, technicians are performing tasks across the entire spectrum of what used to be separated by echelons. The same technician, in this case, removes a box from the C130, a task normally occurring in the Comm Z, and delivers it to the soldier involved in the permanent fight only meters away from the front gate. The level of sustainment is not a function of the ground and the threat, but rather of time. Only with time and resources was KAF able to grow the infrastructure required of higher levels of support necessary to project force. In accordance with the Afghanistan Campaign Plan, which sees an inkblot of security, governance and development expanding with the establishment of permanent tactical infrastructures, the Canadian contingent eventually established a second node, Camp Nathan Smith (CNS). Initially, the node was no more than a leaguer, containing support elements that would be comparable to the front echelons. However, with time and resources, the level of sustainment possible on the node grew to include a kitchen, a warehouse, a workshop and a medical inspection room (MIR). It had encompassed, using the linear terms, a union of support in the F-, A1-, A2 and even elements of the BSA. And because the area outside the gate was so unpredictably unstable, all exchange of resources (e.g., DP, ECP, casualty collection post (CCP) were also being conducted on the camp. Most importantly, the level of support offered was no longer based on lines. This is a solid indicator that the linear model of sustainment is no longer valid to describe the support concept in a COIN environment. 48 Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.2 Summer 2008
Figure 4: Sustainment tasks on nodes and links With the addition of a second node, the Afghanistan battlefield was comparable to a hub and spoke analogy, as shown in Figure 4. The nodes, where the task force has been able to secure a piece of ground, permit the execution of tasks related to static production. For example, tasks in KAF ranged generally from levels 1 to 3, and those in CNS were normally limited o levels 1 or 2. There is no longer a requirement for echeloning of resources from one line to another, because the same resources in a given node can provide many levels of sustainment tasks. Fundamentally there are no more lines. Also, where resources are limited, a sustainment resource can easily be shared between several organizations operating out of the same node or even between adjacent nodes. This increases the requirement for coordination between units, suggesting that resources be more centrally controlled. This is quite different than the linear battlefield, where time and space negate the performance of tasks for different units, at different levels, by the same resources. Sustainment operations within the links have taken on a complexity uncommon to the linear battlefield. Combat service support (CSS) soldiers now have to brave the same combat conditions as manoeuvre elements. Road replenishment is no longer in long, administrative convoys in the secure Comm Z, rather deliberate manoeuvre operations that have to be mounted and executed with the same tactical rigour as the combat patrol; hence the birth of the combat logistics patrol (CLP). The links could also be contracted to the Host Nation in the form of transport trucks, or as called in Afghanistan, “Jingle Trucks1 ”, and tactical airlift. The advantage of contracting is that the contractors are able to travel between nodes with less danger, as they are difficult to recognize by insurgents as a threat. This is not the case in the linear battlefield where contractors are as vulnerable as soldiers as they get closer to the FEBA. As links are immersed in a pit of enemy activity, tasks tend to focus on the recovery back to existing nodes, or the creation of a temporary node on site to allow limited production type tasks in a secure environment. Figure 5: Sustainment tasks as a function of security in the non-linear battlefield Canadian Army Journal Vol. 11.2 Summer 2008 49
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Practical Sustainment Concepts for the Non-Linear Battlespace

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