Terada - Looking Away (Selections).pdf - Townsend Humanities Lab

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20 looking away awareness of appearance, an appearance of appearance, can occur in object perception or in fact perception, whether one is perceiving Erscheinung or Schein at the time. Wordsworth, P. B. Shelley, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, among others, like to describe what it feels like. Many epistemologists, including Kant, hold that some kind of apperception is necessary for any experience at all. In some models, this necessary apperception may be unconscious; if so, then conscious reflexivity of the sort above would not be the primary instance of reflexivity, but would only be experienced as if it were. 25 If, to the contrary, basic apperception is normally minimally conscious, the reflexive “appearance of appearance” is a matter of intensity: I feel primarily “I am seeing this” rather than “(I am seeing) this.” “I am seeing this” is a perfectly rational thought and no illusion. Yet the funny thing is, appearance with an index has the subversive effect of seeming to suspend the fact/value conflation and its demand. And this side effect of suspension is illusory, a trick of the mind. The suspensive illusion comes about because the relationship between Schein and the reflexive appearance of appearance is close enough to be confusing: the latter has come to stand for the former in an almost Pavlovian way. Because of its exceptionality, Schein is more likely to trigger reflexivity. If you’re seeing a shower of silver dots, you can hardly forget that you’re having a perceptual experience. And because Schein induces reflexivity in this way, reflexivity can make us view Erscheinung as Schein—as it does every time one looks at something within a literal frame. In a passage of The Birth of Tragedy that I’ll read later, Nietzsche observes the suspensive side effect of the awareness in and of itself of appearance. He remarks of a lucid dream that by virtue of its lucidity we “have, glimmering through it, the sensation that it is mere appearance [die durchschimmernde Empfindung ihres Scheins],” and goes on to assert on the model of the lucid dream that “philosophical men ...even have a presentiment that the reality in which we live and have our being is also mere 25. Daniel Dennett points out that “second-order thought does not itself have to be conscious in order for its first-order object to be conscious” (Consciousness Explained [Boston: Little, Brown, 1991], 307). Richard Moran argues that it is only when the second-order thought is unconscious that we strongly believe in the object (Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge [Princeton: Princeton UP, 2001]).
pretext 21 appearance [Schein].” 26 One could call such reflexivity attentiveness to appearance or to the “process of appearing [Erscheinen].” 27 Reflexivity can seem to tarry in object perception by foregrounding the for-itselfness of the perception, its sheerness rather than its mereness. 28 There’s a kind of analogy, then, between the permanent irrelevance of Schein to fact perception and the temporary, illusory suspensive effect of reflexive perception with its conscious second-order thought. The thing to remember about Schein and the appearance of appearance, given their confusability, is the following: (1) only Schein is “mere appearance” in the sense of being misleading illusion and an epistemological dead end; (2) Schein almost necessarily includes reflexivity, whereas reflexivity’s Schein-effect is itself an instance of Schein, even as its content may be Erscheinung; (3) both Schein and the “appearance of appearance” can have either heightening or attenuating emotive effects; and (4) both are suspensive in relation to fact perception, Schein epistemically and the appearance of appearance rhetorically. It is this reflexive, suspensive quality—included in Schein but also, without loss of reality, in the appearance of Erscheinung—understood as a temporary phenomenological event and rhetorical effect, in which I’m principally interested. Reflexive awareness of either Schein or Erscheinung, of object perception or of very fleeting phenomena, has liberating or faux-liberating effects, and the cultivation of any of these states is what I mean by “phenomenophilia.” If I said that Pessoa was 26. The Birth of Tragedy [1872, 1886], trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967), 34, KSA 1.26. 27. Martin Seel, Aesthetics of Appearing [2000], trans. John Farrell (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2005), 4. Seel surveys appearing from Baumgartner to contemporary art in order to argue that art constitutes a special kind of appearing. Gestalt psychology and Wittgenstein’s notion of aspect-seeing provide related accounts of perceptual patterns. See Kurt Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1935); Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1968). For illuminating commentary, see Stephen Mulhall, On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects (London: Routledge, 1990). 28. For a brilliant account of the “mere [bloss]” in Kant, see Rodolphe Gasché, The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999), 13–41. Gasché remarks that unlike the English “mere,” “bloss” does not connote the sheer or utter.
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Postscript Freud begins Section VI
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postscript 201 also to be told wher
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Bibliography Index
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208 bibliography Ahmed, Sara. Queer
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210 bibliography ton Christensen an
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212 bibliography Guyer, Paul. Kant
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214 bibliography Machiavelli, Nicco
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216 bibliography Seel, Martin. Aest
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