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Terada - Looking Away (Selections).pdf - Townsend Humanities Lab

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22 looking away<br />

phenemenophilic, I would mean that he is attracted to the way things appear<br />

to him, to his own awareness that they appear to him, and to the<br />

power of looking away to treat Erscheinung as Schein.<br />

Complementarily, when Erscheinung is not experienced as though it<br />

were Schein, or when Schein is perceived as though it were normal appearance,<br />

one is back in the realm of fact perception: the effect of freedom<br />

from the imperative to accept the given is unavailable. So, Kaja<br />

Silverman configures phenomenality and dissatisfaction quite differently<br />

when she (properly) emphasizes the identity between appearance and the<br />

given world. Silverman takes the part of the “world spectators” who, as<br />

she retells the story, decline ideality and remain in Plato’s cave out of<br />

commitment to the given world and the appearances that compose it. 29<br />

For her, the world spectator is a “desiring subject” who “derives pleasure<br />

from his own nonsatisfaction” (World Spectators, 11). Since she construes<br />

appearance as Erscheinung, it makes sense for Silverman to claim<br />

that seeing fundamentally “says ‘yes’ to the world” (20). By the same<br />

logic, though, if you do not want to say “yes” to the world, after Kant<br />

you need an alternative to appearance as Erscheinung. Silverman’s world<br />

spectator also belongs to a community of world spectators for whom one<br />

of the main purposes of language is to enable the comparison of perceptions.<br />

So, Silverman’s narrative moves from perception to language.<br />

Again, using the very same logic, the phenomenophile recedes<br />

from language to mere phenomenality: because no one can share (or appropriate)<br />

one’s merely suspensive, illusory or ephemeral perception,<br />

phenomenophilia becomes a way to get away, or imagine getting away,<br />

from other people.<br />

Defenders of the given tend to be impatient with less than explicit affirmation.<br />

Jean-Luc Marion, for example, objects to Pollock’s and Monet’s<br />

concentration on the “intentional” half of the phenomenological subject/<br />

object dyad because to do so is to create a world “to itself,” “only that,”<br />

where intention dies on the surface of the painting. “Without the work of<br />

the invisible [that is, transcendental laws],” he writes, “what we perceive<br />

as visible actually would offer only a rhapsodic spectacle and confusion<br />

29. Kaja Silverman, World Spectators (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000).

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