The menace came from below - Hack.lu

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$\H1B%-12345X@PJL JOB “HackingPrinters”$

Available products From recognition to protocol decoding Protocol recognition: nDPI, l7filter, NG-firewall Some decoded protocols: Suricata Decoding: Qosmos Business as usual A lot of high profit applications From Network Security Monitoring To user behavior control A lot of work to maintain applications Few opensource implementation with a long list of protocols l7-filter nDPI Éric Leblond, Victor Julien (OISF) The menace came from below Hack.lu 2012 50 / 66
Example of nDPI History Originally called OpenDPI Released under GPL by Ipoque Closed source after Ipoque has been bought Forked by Luca Deri and Ntop team under nDPI name Description A C library implementating protocol recognition More than 100 supported protocols: HTTP, Google, MSsql, Worl of Kung Fu, . . . Library is used for Sniffing in Ntop Packet filtering in Netfilter Éric Leblond, Victor Julien (OISF) The menace came from below Hack.lu 2012 51 / 66
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The menace came from below Éric Le
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Victor Julien a.k.a Inliniac Dutch
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Suricata Features High performance,
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1 Introduction Netfilter and the Co
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Netfilter Definition Packet filteri
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Application Level Gateway Non-linea
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The example of FTP FTP client Logge
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The example of FTP FTP client Logge
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Details of Netfilter implementation
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Do I use helpers? What happens if I
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Do I use helpers? What happens if I
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Global analysis Sane defaults Dange
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FTP analysis If we follow RFC (loos
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IRC analysis The DCC command DCC co
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Using DCC command Client NATed behi
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Using DCC command Client NATed behi
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Demonstration of DCC usage Video Le
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Objective Determine if it is possib
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Attack description Existing attacks
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Attack description Existing attacks
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Attack description for FTP 1 The at
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Demonstration on Netfilter Video É
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Policy violation We’ve manage to
Page 51 and 52: Policy violation We’ve manage to
Page 53 and 54: Counter-measures Anti-spoofing is s
Page 55 and 56: Counter-measures Anti-spoofing is s
Page 57 and 58: Checkpoint setup Checkpoint absolut
Page 59 and 60: Demonstration setup Éric Leblond,
Page 61 and 62: Demonstration setup Let’s do a fi
Page 63 and 64: Demonstration Video Let’s have a
Page 65 and 66: Policy violation One managed to ope
Page 67 and 68: There is no problem Swift reaction
Page 69 and 70: Others protocols IRC As discussed b
Page 71 and 72: 1 Introduction Netfilter and the Co
Page 73 and 74: Protection for Netfilter We only ha
Page 81 and 82: IPv6 protection for Netfilter Since
Page 83 and 84: IPv6 protection for Netfilter The b
Page 85 and 86: Suricata Rules Largely compatible w
Page 87 and 88: Suricata Rules Largely compatible w
Page 89 and 90: Counter measures on Suricata FTP in
Page 91 and 92: Detecting overlapping data Rule Att
Page 93 and 94: Detect FTP injection - step 1 Rule
Page 95 and 96: Detect FTP injection - step 3 Rule
Page 97 and 98: Detect FTP injection - port Rule In
Page 99 and 100: Luajit script Simplified Script f u
Page 101: Protocol analysis: a difficult task
Page 105 and 106: Causing recognition mistake Evading
Page 107 and 108: Don’t mess with the server Issue
Page 109 and 110: Implementing the attack in opensvp
Page 111 and 112: Attack on nDPI Test used Injection
Page 113 and 114: Detecting very low TTL Example TTL
Page 115 and 116: Future changes in Suricata We’re
Page 117 and 118: Using low layer to attack Low layer
Page 119 and 120: SNMP: Security is Not My Problem Ke
Page 121 and 122: Questions Thanks to Do you have any
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