The menace came from below - Hack.lu

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Details of Netfilter implementation ALGs in Netfilter ALGs are called Helpers. Each protocol is implemented as a kernel module. Loading options can be used to configure the helper. Fine-grained setup can be achieved with the CT iptables target. Éric Leblond, Victor Julien (OISF) The menace came from below Hack.lu 2012 11 / 66
Details of Netfilter implementation ALGs in Netfilter ALGs are called Helpers. Each protocol is implemented as a kernel module. Loading options can be used to configure the helper. Fine-grained setup can be achieved with the CT iptables target. Current modules list in Vanilla linux kernel amanda pptp broadcast proto_dccp ftp proto_gre h323 proto_sctp proto_udplite sane irc sip netbios_ns snmp tftp Éric Leblond, Victor Julien (OISF) The menace came from below Hack.lu 2012 11 / 66
Page 1 and 2: The menace came from below Éric Le
Page 3 and 4: Victor Julien a.k.a Inliniac Dutch
Page 5 and 6: Suricata Features High performance,
Page 7 and 8: 1 Introduction Netfilter and the Co
Page 9 and 10: Netfilter Definition Packet filteri
Page 11 and 12: Application Level Gateway Non-linea
Page 13 and 14: The example of FTP FTP client Logge
Page 15: The example of FTP FTP client Logge
Page 19 and 20: Do I use helpers? What happens if I
Page 21 and 22: Do I use helpers? What happens if I
Page 23 and 24: Global analysis Sane defaults Dange
Page 25 and 26: FTP analysis If we follow RFC (loos
Page 27 and 28: IRC analysis The DCC command DCC co
Page 29 and 30: Using DCC command Client NATed behi
Page 31 and 32: Using DCC command Client NATed behi
Page 33 and 34: Demonstration of DCC usage Video Le
Page 35 and 36: Objective Determine if it is possib
Page 37 and 38: Attack description Existing attacks
Page 39 and 40: Attack description Existing attacks
Page 41 and 42: Attack description for FTP 1 The at
Page 47 and 48: Demonstration on Netfilter Video É
Page 49 and 50: Policy violation We’ve manage to
Page 51 and 52: Policy violation We’ve manage to
Page 53 and 54: Counter-measures Anti-spoofing is s
Page 55 and 56: Counter-measures Anti-spoofing is s
Page 57 and 58: Checkpoint setup Checkpoint absolut
Page 59 and 60: Demonstration setup Éric Leblond,
Page 61 and 62: Demonstration setup Let’s do a fi
Page 63 and 64: Demonstration Video Let’s have a
Page 65 and 66: Policy violation One managed to ope
Page 67 and 68:
There is no problem Swift reaction
Page 69 and 70:
Others protocols IRC As discussed b
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1 Introduction Netfilter and the Co
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Protection for Netfilter We only ha
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Page 77 and 78:
Page 79 and 80:
Page 81 and 82:
IPv6 protection for Netfilter Since
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IPv6 protection for Netfilter The b
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Suricata Rules Largely compatible w
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Suricata Rules Largely compatible w
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Counter measures on Suricata FTP in
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Detecting overlapping data Rule Att
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Detect FTP injection - step 1 Rule
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Detect FTP injection - step 3 Rule
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Detect FTP injection - port Rule In
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Luajit script Simplified Script f u
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Protocol analysis: a difficult task
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Example of nDPI History Originally
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Causing recognition mistake Evading
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Don’t mess with the server Issue
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Implementing the attack in opensvp
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Attack on nDPI Test used Injection
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Detecting very low TTL Example TTL
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Future changes in Suricata We’re
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Using low layer to attack Low layer
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SNMP: Security is Not My Problem Ke
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Questions Thanks to Do you have any
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The menace came from below - Hack.lu

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