Leyte Gulf - USS Natoma Bay CVE-62

A little past 0800, TF 38 search planes sighted Kurita's
Center Force entering the Sibuyan Sea. Against these ships,
which had no air cover, Halsey's three carrier groups in the
course of the day hurled five powerful air strikes. In this
air-waged Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, four of Kurita's
battleships were damaged and his heavy cruiser Myoko was put
out of action. The super-battleship Musashi, hit by bombs
and torpedoes, began trailing astern of the formation. In
the last attack of the day, planes from all three U.S.
carrier groups concentrated on this monster, which after
absorbing 19 torpedo and 17 bomb hits rolled over and sank,
carrying down more than 1,000 men. Shortly afterward at
about 1530, Kurita reversed course and headed back west.
The Japanese air command on Luzon could not provide
Kurita with a combat air patrol because they were attacking
Sherman's carrier group with every plane they had - on the
assumption that this was the whole U.S. Third Fleet.
Sherman's fighters met the attackers at a distance and shot
them down in great numbers. One Japanese bomber got through,
however, and put a bomb into the light carrier Princeton,
which blazed with uncontrollable fires. These at last set
off her torpedo stowage. The explosion blew off her stern
and after flight deck and swept the decks of the cruiser
Birmingham, then alongside, with metallic chunks and other
debris that killed more than 200 of her crew. Ozawa's
Northern Force, maneuvering off Cape Engaño, launched
against Sherman's group 76 planes, which took heavy losses
without achieving anything. Most of the surviving pilots,
unskilled in carrier landings, proceeded to Luzon airfields.
Thus far the fact of divided command in the Allied naval
forces had produced no problems, even though Commander
Seventh Fleet Admiral Kinkaid and Commander Third Fleet
Admiral Halsey acted with almost complete independence.
General MacArthur in the cruiser Nashville was almost within
hailing distance of Kinkaid in the amphibious command ship
Wasatch, but the general consciously avoided interfering in
naval operations. Nimitz's hands-off policy kept him at his
Pearl Harbor headquarters, lest his mere presence at an
operation inhibit the tactical commander in exercising his
own judgment. Nimitz's participation was limited to issuing
18 Leyte Gulf