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Who Goes There: Friend or Foe? - Federation of American Scientists

Who Goes There: Friend or Foe? - Federation of American Scientists

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38 I <strong>Who</strong> <strong>Goes</strong> <strong>There</strong>: <strong>Friend</strong> <strong>or</strong> <strong>Foe</strong>?<br />

aircraft is hostile, other aircraft flying in the same<br />

f<strong>or</strong>mation are also assumed hostile. (This is<br />

inf<strong>or</strong>mally called “guilt by association.”) This<br />

assessment is usually accurate, but scenarios in<br />

which a friendly fighter is in hot pursuit <strong>of</strong> an<br />

enemy are also easy to imagine. Some other<br />

“rules” are implicit and seem to result from<br />

human nature, <strong>or</strong> can be understood in terms <strong>of</strong><br />

the effects <strong>of</strong> an increased perception <strong>of</strong> threat—<br />

whether real <strong>or</strong> not-discussed above. Analysis<br />

<strong>of</strong> training exercises shows clearly that a gunner’s<br />

recent experience strongly influences his judgments<br />

about friend and foe. If, f<strong>or</strong> example, an air<br />

defense unit has just been attacked by “hostile”<br />

aircraft in a training exercise, then the next<br />

airplane that flies over is much m<strong>or</strong>e likely to be<br />

judged hostile than it would have been if the<br />

previous overflight had been by friendly aircraft.<br />

Gunners are not, <strong>of</strong> course, taught to make these<br />

prejudicial assumptions, and this is not an explicit<br />

‘‘rule,’ but few will be surprised by the observation.<br />

IDENTIFICATION: FRIEND OR FOE<br />

‘‘The first requirement in warfare is the ability<br />

to distinguish friend from foe.” 14<br />

This statement<br />

from a W<strong>or</strong>ld War II field manual makes clear the<br />

imp<strong>or</strong>tance-but not the difficulty--<strong>of</strong> IFF. Even<br />

the most straightf<strong>or</strong>ward technique, looking at a<br />

potential target with human eyes, is neither<br />

simple n<strong>or</strong> reliable; combatants need training to<br />

identify f<strong>or</strong>ces quickly. Even with training, mistakes<br />

that appear egregious in the calm <strong>of</strong><br />

peaceful retrospection are all too common in the<br />

confusion <strong>of</strong> combat. The great increase in<br />

weapon range-made possible primarily by developments<br />

in weapon guidance systems since<br />

W<strong>or</strong>ld War II-has in many cases far outstripped<br />

the ability <strong>of</strong> human observers relying just on<br />

their eyes. IFF today requires additional inf<strong>or</strong>mation<br />

from longer range sens<strong>or</strong>s.<br />

14 Recognition Picton’ai Manual, War Department Field Wutd 30-30 (June 1943), P. 1.<br />

Different weapon systems have different requirements<br />

f<strong>or</strong> IFF systems. The IFF needed f<strong>or</strong><br />

sh<strong>or</strong>t-range and long-range weapons, f<strong>or</strong> example,<br />

may have very different reactions times,<br />

abilities to track multiple targets, likelihood <strong>of</strong><br />

revealing position, and so on, as well as the<br />

obviously different requirements f<strong>or</strong> range.<br />

~ IFF and the Rules <strong>of</strong> Engagement<br />

Differences in the rules <strong>of</strong> engagement will<br />

shift emphasis among technical approaches to<br />

IFF. <strong>There</strong> is no technical solution that is optimal<br />

f<strong>or</strong> providing positive identification <strong>of</strong> friend and<br />

foe, where “positive identification” means identification<br />

based on positive presence <strong>of</strong> some<br />

evidence. F<strong>or</strong> example, response to a reliable IFF<br />

interrogation system is positive evidence that the<br />

target is a friend, but lack <strong>of</strong> response is not<br />

positive evidence that it is an enemy.<br />

In defense <strong>of</strong> critical point targets, aircraft<br />

carriers being the premier example, defenders<br />

must assume that ambiguous targets are potentially<br />

hostile until proven friendly. Thus, the<br />

emphasis is on systems that can prove a target<br />

friendly, such as cooperative question-andanswer<br />

systems. The rules <strong>of</strong> engagement f<strong>or</strong> area<br />

defense will give relatively greater emphasis to<br />

positive identification <strong>of</strong> foes, hence, noncooperative<br />

foe identifiers will be relatively m<strong>or</strong>e<br />

imp<strong>or</strong>tant with question-and-answer systems providing<br />

frost-<strong>or</strong>der s<strong>or</strong>ting <strong>of</strong> targets into friends<br />

and unknowns.<br />

Ground f<strong>or</strong>ces, when under extreme pressure to<br />

fire quickly, also find themselves in a situation<br />

where ambiguous targets must be assumed hostile<br />

until proven friendly. Thus, ground f<strong>or</strong>ces will<br />

concentrate on developing question-and-answer<br />

friend identifiers. (In addition, active IFF by<br />

ground f<strong>or</strong>ces is in a primitive state compared to<br />

that <strong>of</strong> air f<strong>or</strong>ces and question-and-answer systems,<br />

being easier to implement than noncooperative<br />

systems, are a good place to start.)

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