william t. costello, sj - The School of Literature, Communication, and ...

THE FRAMEWORK OF SCHOLASTICISM 23
Natural liberty, say the philosophers, is to live as one pleases [the
date, be it noted, is pre-Hobbsian] .
But this liberty is bridled by the threat of punishment
Therefore, the threat of punishment is a bridle of natural liberty.
The syllogism has substance and Boyes has to distinguish the
major premise. "I confess/' he says, "that it puts a bridle on corrupt
nature, but we are not disputing about that. I am talking
about natura Integra et incorrupta [human nature before the fall
of man] as being in need of your bridle. The good hate sin out
of the love of virtue. The evil hate it out of fear of pain."
a dis-
Boyes has just made use of his prerogative of explaining
tinction. Sometimes, the answerer on his own initiative expounded
the meaning of his distinction; sometimes, the moderator (never
the opponent) would interject, "Explica!" if he thought the an-
swerer was using an unusual distinction or one he (the answerer)
did not understand.
But Boyes's opponent is a bulldog and \frill not be shaken off
by a distinction on the various states of nature. He presses Boyes,
affirming that any nature, corrupt or incorrupt, has appetites,
and is, therefore, in need of bridle. Boyes blocks the punch by
admitting that, "although there is no nature entirely lacking in
appetite, still there are in human society those sterling characters
who are strengthened in innate virtue by fear of punishment."
The opponent sees an opening and pounces: "Therefore, the
good do not hate sin for fear of punishment!" "Nego argumentum,"
says Boyes.
Boyes is now getting into difficulty, for the neat syllogism at hand.
opponent has a
Where several causes concur in an effect, the effect cannot be
attributed to any one in particular.
But in all virtuous actions several causes concur.
Therefore, in these actions the effect cannot be attributed to any
one in particular [i.e., to fear of punishment].
Boyes is being closed in. "But neither do I affirm," he says, "that
virtue is to be attributed to a single cause."
"Therefore," the opponent immediately shoots back, "in human
affairs the threat of punishment does not suffice."
Boyes clinches with a "Nego argumentum" (another denial of
a subsumed premise, that is, a statement for which proof will be
offered). The opponent hits with another enthymeme: "Besides
the threat of punishment, natural goodness is required. There-