IMC 0609, App A - NRC

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| SDP PHASE 1 SCREENING WORKSHEET FOR IE, MS, and B CORNERSTONES Seismic, Flooding, and Severe Weather Screening Criteria 1. Does the finding involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event (e.g., seismic snubbers, flooding barriers, tornado doors)? 9 If YES ý continue to question 2 9 If NO ý skip to question 3 2. If the equipment or safety function is assumed to be completely failed or unavailable, are ANY of the following three statements TRUE? The loss of this equipment or function by itself, during the external initiating event it was intended to mitigate a) would cause a plant trip or any of the Initiating Events used by Phase 2 for the plant in question; b) would degrade two or more Trains of a multi-train safety system or function; c) would degrade one or more Trains of a system that supports a safety system or function. 9 If YES ýthe finding is potentially risk significant due to external initiating event core damage sequences - return to page 4 of this Worksheet 9 If NO, screen as Green 3. Does the finding involve the total loss of any safety function, identified by the licensee through a PRA, IPEEE, or similar analysis, that contributes to external event initiated core damage accident sequences (i.e., initiated by a seismic, flooding, or severe weather event)? 9 If YES ýthe finding is potentially risk significant due to external initiating event core damage sequences - return to page 4 of this Worksheet 9 If NO, screen as Green Result of Phase 1 screening process: 9 Screen as Green 9 Go to Phase 2 9 Go to Phase 3 Important Assumptions: Performed by: ______________________________________ Date: _______________ Page 5 of 5 <strong>0609</strong>, <strong>App</strong> A, Att 1 A1-10 Issue Date: 12/01/04
Row Initiating Event (IE) Frequency I II III IV V VI Table 1 - Generic Example - Categories for Initiating Events >1 per 1-10 yr C Reactor Trip (TRANS) C Loss of Power Conversion System (TPCS) 1 per 10-10 2 yr C Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) C Inadvertent or Stuck Open SRV (IORV) - (BWR) 1 per 10 2 -10 3 yr C Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) C Loss of Component Cooling Water (LCCW) C Stuck open PORV/SRV (SORV) - (PWR) C Small LOCA including RCP seal failures - (PWR) C MSLB/MFLB 1 per 10 3 -10 4 yr C Small LOCA (RCS rupture) - (BWR) C Med LOCA C loss of offsite power with loss of one AC bus (LEAC) 1 per 10 4 -10 5 yr C Large LOCA C ATWS - (BWR) 30 days 30-3 days
Page 1 and 2: I APPLICABILITY APPENDIX A Determin
Page 3 and 4: Phase 3 is intended to be performed
Page 5 and 6: APPENDIX A ATTACHMENT 1 User Guidan
Page 7 and 8: (1) For each of the inspection scen
Page 9 and 10: Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) Mo
Page 11 and 12: CORNERSTONES AND FUNCTIONS DEGRADED
Page 13: Initiating Events Cornerstone LOCA
Page 17 and 18: Affected System Major Components Su
Page 19 and 20: Recovery of Failed Train Table 4 -
Page 21 and 22: Table of Contents APPENDIX A ATTACH
Page 23 and 24: 1.3 Inspection Finding (Normally Cr
Page 25 and 26: first revision of the site specific
Page 27 and 28: Basis: Evaluation of this type of i
Page 29: these three accident sequences woul

IMC 0609, App A - NRC

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