IMC 0609, App A - NRC

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Phase 1 - Characterization and Initial Screening of Findings Phase 1 is used to characterize the important attributes of the inspection finding and to initially screen the finding to identify those with very lowsignificance, which can be dispositioned by the licensee’s corrective action program. The Phase 1 Worksheet is applicable for all plant types and is included in this Appendix. Phase 1 is intended to be accomplished by the inspection staff, with the assistance of a Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA), if needed. Phase 2 - Risk Significance Estimation and Justification Using the Site Specific Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook : Phase 2 is used to develop a plant specific estimate of the risk significance of an inspection finding and to develop the basis for that determination. The Phase 2 Worksheets are plant-specific in order to account for variations in available mitigation equipment and other plant-specific attributes. The examples of Phase 2 Worksheets used in this Appendix are identified as Table 3.XX. When conducting a Phase 2 analysis, the actual data contained in the various parts of Table 3 in the site specific risk-informed inspection notebook must be used. The risk-informed inspection notebooks can be found on the NRC internal web-page by accessing “Risk Informed Regulatory Activities” on the NRR Home Page. The notebooks are not publicly available. The Phase 2 is intended to be accomplished by the inspection staff, with the assistance of an SRA, if needed. SRAs should review all completed Phase 2 assessments to ensure the results are consistent with the Phase 2 guidance. The results of the Phase 2 analysis may be used as the final significance determination. Phase 3 - Risk Significance Estimation Using Any Risk Basis That Departs from the Phase 1 or 2 Process: Phase 3 is used to address those situations that depart from the guidance provided for Phase 1 or Phase 2. A Phase 3 analysis need be no more detailed than an adjustment to the Phase 2 result that is not explicitly permitted by this Appendix. If the Phase 2 SDP Worksheets do not clearly address the inspection finding of concern (e.g., internal flooding, etc.), then a Phase 3 analysis of the inspection finding should be performed to characterize the significance of the finding. 0609, App A A-2 Issue Date: 12/01/04
Phase 3 is intended to be performed using appropriate PRA techniques and rely on the expertise of an SRA or risk analyst using the best available information that is accessible or can be determined within the SDP timeliness goal. IV TREATMENT OF CONCURRENT MULTIPLE EQUIPMENT OR FUNCTIONAL DEGRADATIONS Concurrent multiple equipment or functional degradations are evaluated based on their cause. If the concurrent multiple equipment or functional degradations resulted from a common cause (e.g., a single inadequate maintenance procedure that directly resulted in deficient maintenance being performed on multiple components), then a single inspection finding is written. The significance characterization is determined using a reactor safety Phase 3 SDP, is based on the time periods during which the degradations existed, and reflects the total increase in core damage frequency (CDF). If multiple cornerstones were affected, the single finding will be assigned to the cornerstone which best reflects the dominant risk influences. The justification for the existence of a common cause must be a stronger causal relationship than poor management or crosscutting programs (e.g., an inadequate problem identification and resolution program is an inadequate basis to justify a common cause finding). If independent causes are determined to have resulted in multiple equipment or functional degradations, then separate inspection findings are written. The findings are individually characterized for significance, assuming none of the other independent findings existed. This is necessary to account for the probabilistic independence of the findings. In all cases, the risk of concurrent multiple equipment or functional degradations and the staff’s basis for treating these effects as either having a common cause or being independent should be documented in an inspection report or other appropriate public correspondence. V NON-APPLICABILITY OF SDP FOR NRC DETERMINATION OF RISK SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS The risk significance of actual reactor events caused or complicated by equipment malfunction or operator error must be assessed by NRC risk analysts in accordance with MD 8.3, “NRC Incident Investigation Program.” Although this SDP may provide useful risk insights to inspectors for event response or followup, it was not designed for that purpose. Because the SDP is used to estimate the risk significance of licensee performance deficiencies, including those that manifest themselves during events, the performance deficiencies associated with an actual reactor event should be dispositioned using the SDP in the same fashion as all other performance deficiencies. Issue Date: 12/01/04 A-3 0609, App A
Page 1: I APPLICABILITY APPENDIX A Determin
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IMC 0609, App A - NRC

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