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physicsworld.com<br />

Towards global quantum communication<br />

QKD at time t 1<br />

A<br />

Earth<br />

Global communication, such as fibre-optic broadband, could<br />

be made more robust by establishing a secure encryption<br />

key between two communicators that no-one else could<br />

possibly know. This could be done by using a satellite<br />

enabled with quantum technologies to act as a kind of relay<br />

between two ground stations to establish a secure key.<br />

One way of doing this would be a “trusted QKD node” approach<br />

(left), in which an orbiting satellite first establishes a key –<br />

key 1 – with station A via quantum key distribution (QKD),<br />

sending single photons one at a time either by uplink (from<br />

ground to satellite) or downlink (from satellite to ground). The<br />

satellite travels some Adistance and then B establishes another,<br />

different, key – key 2 – with station B. (QKD itself cannot<br />

transmit existing keys, but only generate new ones.) The<br />

satellite then encodes key 1 with key 2 (encrypting it) and<br />

transmits the result over radio communications to ground<br />

station B, which uses the key Earth it knows (key 2) to determine<br />

key 1. At this point both ground stations possess a shared<br />

secure key – key 1 – which enables them to communicate<br />

securely on the ground via the usual classical means.<br />

This approach comes with a caveat, however: the satellite<br />

knows the secure key that the ground stations will use. If a<br />

nefarious entity were to somehow penetrate the security of<br />

the satellite, which would be no small feat given a properly<br />

designed autonomous orbiter, then the security of the<br />

communication on the ground would be vulnerable. One has<br />

tems (including the moving observers scenario above).<br />

Moreover, long-distance “quantum teleportation”<br />

experiments could be conducted – the first baby steps<br />

towards realizing the famous Star Trek “Beam me up,<br />

Scotty” command may be only a few years away.<br />

Meanwhile, back on Earth...<br />

For these experiments to be conducted any time soon,<br />

an actual design for a satellite must be nailed down<br />

and, of course, built. As for anything of a space-faring<br />

pedigree, this encompasses a number of technical<br />

challenges that need to be resolved. First and foremost<br />

is figuring out how to successfully transmit the<br />

quantum optical signal between the satellite and the<br />

ground station, which has been studied in increasing<br />

detail by various groups worldwide. The problem<br />

B<br />

QKD at time t 2<br />

Quantum frontiers: Communication in space<br />

to trust that the satellite is secure.<br />

Fortunately, it is possible to utilize a different approach<br />

such that the satellite can act as an “untrusted node” (right).<br />

Here, an orbiting satellite generates entangled photon<br />

pairs and transmits one photon of the pair to each of the<br />

ground stations A and B simultaneously. The entanglement<br />

correlations between the photon pairs allow A and B to<br />

extract a common secret key that even the satellite does<br />

not know. The ground stations could then compare their<br />

detection statistics, independent of the source, in a manner<br />

similar to a Bell test (see box opposite), allowing them to<br />

verify that no other party gained information about the<br />

states they received – not even the satellite. (Another<br />

proposal reverses this idea, with each ground station<br />

generating and transmitting single photons that are received<br />

and entangled by the satellite, although this is considerably<br />

more technically challenging.)<br />

Verification of the trustworthiness of the source means<br />

that no assumptions have to be made about the security of<br />

the satellite, but it does mean that the satellite needs much<br />

more complex kit, including an entangled photon source and<br />

two telescopes that can be pointed independently. These<br />

extra complications make the trusted node, by comparison,<br />

seem like a good stepping stone for testing quantum<br />

encryption with a satellite, moving towards an untrusted<br />

node approach as a long-term solution.<br />

that needs to be overcome is atmospheric loss – not<br />

in space, but in the region near the ground station.<br />

Other effects to contend with include atmospheric<br />

turbulence, diffraction and background noise. Our<br />

own group at the Institute for Quantum Computing<br />

(IQC) in Waterloo, Canada, has recently concluded<br />

a comprehensive theoretical study, simultaneously<br />

incorporating all of the significant effects on the signal<br />

throughput, which has helped us to determine what<br />

overall design features of the satellite and ground station<br />

systems would be suitable. We also calculated the<br />

expected performance of the quantum optical signal<br />

for QKD and fundamental science endeavours.<br />

Another important technical challenge is to ensure<br />

that the quantum channel between the satellite and<br />

the ground station is precisely aligned as we need<br />

Physics World March 2013 55<br />

A<br />

Earth<br />

Earth<br />

B<br />

QKD<br />

A B<br />

The puzzling<br />

question is<br />

at what point<br />

the outcome<br />

is determined,<br />

when the<br />

time-order of<br />

measurement<br />

events<br />

depends on<br />

which observer<br />

asks the<br />

question

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