The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics - College of Stoic Philosophers

384 THE STOICS. [
Chap. but it has a reflex action also, iiifluencinof alike the
XIV . .
_ tone and the results of theoretic enquiry. If the
the Stidc dutv of man is declared to consist in brinsrinor his
actions into harmony with the Jaws of the universe,
it becomes also necessary that he should endeavour
himself to know the world and its laws. The more
his knowledge of the world increases, the greater
will be the value which he attaches to the forms of
scientific procedure. If, moreover, man is required
to be nothing more than an instrument of the uni-
versal law, it is only consistent to suppose
an ab-
solute regularity of procedure in the universe, an
unbroken connection of cause and effect, and ulti-
mately to refer everything to one highest all-moving
cause, and to include everything under one primary
substance. If in human life the individual has no
rights as against the laws of the universe, then all that
is of individual occurrence in the world is powerless
against universal necessity. On the other hand, if
in the case of man everything turns upon strength
of will, then likewise in the universe the acting power
must be regarded as the highest and most exalted.
There arises thus that view of the world as a series
of forces which constitutes one of the most peculiar
and thorough-going characteristics of the Stoic view
of nature.' Lastly, if such excessive importance is at-
tached to practical conduct as is done by the Stoics,
that sensuous view of the world which finds its crudest
expression in the Stoic Materialism and reliance on
the senses,'^ will most nearly accord with speculation.
• See p. 139.
- See p. 132.