The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics - College of Stoic Philosophers

CARNEADES. 541
absolute distinction can be drawn between much and Chap.
little, in short between all differences in quantity
and that it is the most natural course in all such
cases to follow Chrysippus, and to avoid the danger-
ous inferences which may be drawn by withholding
judgment.' Arguing from these facts, Carneades
concluded at first in regard to impressions of the
senses, that there is no such thing as (^avraa-ia
KaraXrjTTTiKr) in the Stoic sense of the term, in other
words, that no perception
contains in itself cha-
racteristics, by virtue of which its truth may be
inferred with certainty.- This fact being granted,
the possibility is in his opinion precluded of there
residing in the understanding a standard for the
distinction of truth from falsehood. The under-
standing —and this belief was shared by his opponents—must
derive its material from the senses.^
Logic tests the formal accuracy
of combinations of
thought, but gives no insight into their import.'
Direct proofs of the uncertainty of intellectual con-
victions are not therefore needed. The same result
may also be attained in a more personal way, by
raising the question, how individuals obtain their
in Clr. Acad. ii. 30, 95 (by Car- Cic. Acad. ii. 28, 91, who
neades as he says, 98), as an here appears to be following
instance in point. Philo, and, subsequently, Car-
'
Sext. 416 ; Cic. 1. c. 29, 92. neades as well. Carneades also
Since Chrysippus tried to meet gives utterance to a similar
the chain-argument, it may be view of dialectic in Stob. Floril.
supposed that this fallacy had 9.3, 13 (conf. Plut. C. Not. 2,
been used by Arcesilaus against 4), comparing it to a polypus
the Stoics. consuming
its own tentacles.
' Sext. vii. 1 64 ; Avgustin. It is able, he conceives, to
c. Acad. ii. 5, 11. expose fallacies, but not to dis-
^ Sext. 165. cover truth.
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