Strauss and Watkins on Hobbes' Political Philosophy: A Review

STRAUSS AND WATKINS ON HOBBES 203
Hobbes’s theory of liberty <strong>and</strong> punishment was implied by his theory
of mechanical metaphysics
In Chapter VII, “Liberty,” <strong>Watkins</strong> argues that Hobbes’s ideas of
political liberty <strong>and</strong> punishment are based on a concept of
“endeavour” derived from his mechanistic <strong>and</strong> deterministic
metaphysics <strong>and</strong> that he used the idea of “endeavour” to overcome
the duality of body-mind. <strong>Watkins</strong> sets out to demonstrate that
“endeavour” is an important philosophical concept. To do so,
<strong>Watkins</strong> surveys Hobbes’s explanations of endeavour <strong>and</strong> asserts: “it
becomes clear that by ‘endeavour’ he meant, not instantaneous
speed, but instantaneous velocity in his sense—the pressure or
motive force behind the movement, rather than the movement
itself” (124). <strong>Watkins</strong> points out that any actual movement may be
the result of one or many “endeavours.”
. . . the idea that [a body’s actual] motion may be the resultant of various
endeavours prepared the way for a ‘haunted-universe’ doctrine whereby the
physical world is filled by an invisible system of endeavours, powers, pressures,
or forces. Even the most dead-seeming chunk of inert matter is, one might
almost say, brought to life by this idea, transformed into something humming
silently with incipient motion (124).
<strong>Watkins</strong> sets up quotations—similar in both thought <strong>and</strong> phrase-
ology—from both Hobbes <strong>and</strong> Leibniz to show that Leibniz adopted
<strong>and</strong> developed Hobbes’s concept of “endeavour” renaming it “con-
atus”; <strong>and</strong> that he derived from Hobbes the idea that endeavours
continue to infinity. <strong>Watkins</strong> also argues, however, that Leibniz in-
verted Hobbes’s use of endeavour: “Leibniz integrated matter from
psycho-physical intensities, whereas Hobbes differentiated motion
into psycho-physical intensities” (131-132).
Having argued the philosophical significance of the idea of
endeavour, <strong>Watkins</strong> now turns to the political implications Hobbes
drew from the concept. <strong>Watkins</strong> explains that Hobbes’s
concept of liberty is unimpeded endeavour. <strong>Watkins</strong> urges that Hobbes’s
distinction between voluntary <strong>and</strong> involuntary motion corresponds
to the difference between those internal endeavours which result in
a body moving itself <strong>and</strong> those external endeavours acting on a body
from the outside. Only the former is “free” movement in Hobbes’s
theory, but the conceptual distinction rests on a legitimate logical
inference from the idea of “endeavour.” Moreover, both
“voluntary” <strong>and</strong> “involuntary” motion are consistent with Hobbes’s