Strauss and Watkins on Hobbes' Political Philosophy: A Review

STRAUSS AND WATKINS ON HOBBES 205
Dumpty—or “super-nominalist”—theory. He describes his argu-
ment as follows:
In this section I shall argue as follows: had Hobbes consistently abided by his
nominalist ontology (that there is nothing universal in the world but names,
every thing named being individual <strong>and</strong> singular), Leibniz would have been
right [that Hobbes was a super-nominalist]; moreover, Hobbes often appears to
endorse the ‘super-nominalist’ view that the truth or falsity of all propositions is
automatically determined by nothing but verbal conventions or stipulations;
however, Hobbes did not consistently abide by his nominalist ontology: he
sometimes allowed that a common name may st<strong>and</strong> for something which is not
individual <strong>and</strong> singular[—for a characteristic individual <strong>and</strong> singular]—for a
characteristic or a property or (as he called it) an accident which may be shared
by many individual things; <strong>and</strong> the admission of accidents into his ontology
enabled him to avoid a Humpty-Dumpty theory of truth, at least in connection
with factual propositions. In the section after this I shall argue that, since he did
not admit any moral accidents (or non-natural qualities, as G.E. Moore called
them), Hobbes did perforce take a Humpty-Dumpty view of moral utterances,
the role of Humpty-Dumpty being given to the sovereign (144-145). ‡
Thus, <strong>Watkins</strong> sets the stage to refute Warrender’s assertion that the
sovereign does not create justice <strong>and</strong> injustice: Hobbes’s nominalist
ontology is compromised only with respect to natural philosophy.
Hobbes admits that natural objects may share natural traits or “ac-
cidents.” However, there are no non-natural “accidents”—such as
“justice” <strong>and</strong> “injustice”—<strong>and</strong> no such names in civil society until
the sovereign creates those names. Hobbes’s view of the nature of
language, combined with his materialist ontology, leads to the con-
sequence that in the state of nature there are as many meanings of
“justice” as there are people naming “justice.” Only under the
authority of a sovereign is there only one who gives names <strong>and</strong> only
one use of the name “justice.” Thus, Hobbes has escaped from what
he thought was the problem of differing opinions. Since what the
sovereign names as “just” is so because he says so, it is absurd to
“disagree” with the sovereign. Similarly, it is impossible for a law or
comm<strong>and</strong> of the sovereign to be anything other than just. For these
reasons also, the sovereign must prescribe how God—who has no
natural accidents—is to be addressed in public worship.
In the last section of this chapter, <strong>Watkins</strong> seeks to break new
ground with his theory of “How the sovereign is made.” <strong>Watkins</strong>
says the sovereign is made, not by the transfer of men’s right or
power or will, but by renunciation of their power <strong>and</strong> rights <strong>and</strong> the
transfer of their names. <strong>Watkins</strong> argues that this interpretation of