Strauss and Watkins on Hobbes' Political Philosophy: A Review

STRAUSS AND WATKINS ON HOBBES 187
Hobbes’s moral attitude <strong>and</strong> worldview were constant throughout
his adult life.
In his last chapter, “The New Political Science,” <strong>Strauss</strong> evaluates
the effect of Hobbes’s scientific interests on his humanistic political
intention. <strong>Strauss</strong> summarizes his preceding chapters as showing a
set of movements in Hobbes’s thought, states that these movements
are all united by Hobbes’s single <strong>and</strong> singular moral attitude, <strong>and</strong>
proceeds to the conclusion that this attitude is both logically <strong>and</strong>
biographically prior to Hobbes’s scientific interests. He then raises
the subject of: “how Hobbes’s mathematical <strong>and</strong> scientific studies
furthered or hindered his political philosophy.” In my view,
<strong>Strauss</strong>’s treatment of this subject is this volume’s major contribution
to Hobbes criticism.
<strong>Strauss</strong> presents another genetic analysis, concentrating this time
on Hobbes’s moral attitude <strong>and</strong> worldview. <strong>Strauss</strong>’s conclusions
may be summarized as follows: early “humanist” Hobbes was con-
vinced of the usefulness of history for teaching men to apply precept.
Hobbes’s study of history convinced him that vanity <strong>and</strong> fear were
the strongest passions moving mankind. Thus, even as early as his
humanist period, Hobbes analyzed the passions differently than did
the tradition. That is, Hobbes picked out deception for special con-
demnation, regarded public display of a passion as a sign of its evil
character, <strong>and</strong> regretted good fortune because of the pleasant delu-
sion it brings. <strong>Strauss</strong> makes a special comparison of Hobbes <strong>and</strong>
Aristotle with respect to their differences as regards “pleasant
things” (134-5). Aristotle’s conception involved enjoyment of a state
or condition of fulfillment <strong>and</strong> ease. However, Hobbes equated the
pleasant with “successful striving <strong>and</strong> desiring” (134). On this basis:
the pleasant is not so much what is naturally pleasant, as the ‘pleasant’ move-
ment from one pleasant thing to another pleasant thing, to a pleasanter thing,
the consciousness which accompanies this movement, more accurately, self-
consciousness (134-135).
However, this pleasure is not mere self-consciousness. Pleasure exists
only in self-conscious comparison with others.
For these reasons <strong>Strauss</strong> concludes: insofar as his attitudes <strong>and</strong>
philosophic requirements were concerned, Hobbes had already
broken with the content of tradition during his humanist period