July-August - Air Defense Artillery

U.S. Army Photo
Pfc. V. L. Cresswell, 21st AAA AWl Bn.
(SP), an ammo bearer on a quad .50
machine gun, waits to reload. Note armored
vest worn by alll\1I6 crewmen.
fan try battalion commander. It is here
that the broad directives of the combat
order must be reduced to specific details
of who will do what, when, where and
how.
It is vital for the 1\1\1\ platoon leader
to know intimately the plans of the
infantry battalion commander. Knowing
these plans our platoon leaders make
thorough ground reconnaissance, choose
routes of approach, .select positions, and
make plans for displacement to provide
continuous support.
Platoon leaders then advise supported
battalion commanders of their plans and
to what extent they are able to support
a particular operation. Coordination with
infantry company commanders is then
completed. It should also be mentioned
that our platoons work very closely with
tank units and coordination with tank
unit commanders is particularly important.
AAA SUPPORTS INFANTRY ATTACK
JPL1\NS, reconnaissance, and coordination
have been completed. Orders are
issued to the platoon. H I-lour draws
near. Artillery begins to pound the objective.
M 16's move up with tanks to
initial firing positions, usually on the
line of departure, and at H minus 10
start saturating the objective which is
usually a rugged hill. At H Hour the
infantry jumps off, and 1\116 crews observe
panels worn on backs of leading
elements and continue to fire neutralization
fire ahead of them. During the
course of the attack our platoon leaders
aggressively move their guns forward to
deliver maximum support.
JULY-AUGUST, 1951
In considering our operation in the
attack mention should be made of task
force support and strong combat patrol
acti,'ities. In Task Forces Doh-in and
Bartlett, which spearheaded the division's
drive to the Han River, two platoons
of 1\116's (four 1\116's each) accompanied
each force. They delivered
saturation fire as required by attacking
echelons and protected trains forward of
the lines of departure. Our 1\116's frequently
assist tank-infantry teams on
strong combat patrols by deli,'ering covering
fire ,,:hen required.
A RIVER CROSSING
T HE I-Ian River crossing provided a
wonderful opportunity for our weapons
to show their effectiveness. The regimental
combat team commanders showed
an appreciation of the value of M16's in
their plans for the assault crossing and
the development of the attack on the far
bank. The wide sandy beach on the
south bank provided space for employment
of almost three complete batteries.
There was no cover and our crews
occupied positions during darkness the
night before the crossing. At H minus
twenty while darkness still obscured the
far bank of the river, our guns joined the
artillery in saturating predetermined sectors
of the enemy shore. At H I-lour the
artillery lifted, and the far shore became
visible. As the assault troops crossed the
river in boats, our guns delivered covering
fire. After the infantry gained a
beachhead they fired on the Hanks and at
targets of opportunity.
For the initial phase of the crossing all
weapons were under regimental control.
After ferries and bridges became a,'ailable,
our weapons reverted to infantry
battalion control and joined tanks and
infantry on the far shore to patrol forward
to search out the enemy.
Statistics for the battalion resulting
from the river crossing were as follows:
Period 7-10 1\larch: Enemy: 641 certified
killed; 1,077 additional estimated
killed; prisoners of war seven. Casualties
sustained: wounded in action three.
Moving up with infantry.
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
THE 21st, until April 22, 1951, had
little occasion to be used in defensive
fighting. To be sure, our M 16's had
been placed on the infantry's perimeter
defenses organized to repel night counterattacks
on newly won objectives, and
several enemy counterattacks of limited
size were encountered and repulsed.
Then came the long-expected, fullstale
counteroffensive. Red hordes
swarmed from the North. \Vith utter
disregard for casualties they walked
through artillery concentrations and continued
their pressure on UN lines.
UN policy was to inflict maximum casualties
while making orderly withdrawals
to more tenable positions. Our
weapons were well suited to carry out
this policy.
In general 1'\'116'5in defensive fighting
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