July-August - Air Defense Artillery

AIRBORNE AAA By Capt. H. W. C. Furman, Arty.
AIRBORNE warfare, the theorv of
vertical envelopment, the new and rapid
means of transporting large bodies of
troops, is as radical a de\'elopment as the
Chinese im'ention of gunpowder, even
though it has been developed smoothly
and without radical losses. The calculated
dreams of Generals John Lee, 1\latthew
Ridgway and "Slim Jim" Gavin
have developed into the rapid mm'ement
over thousand of miles, of death-dealing
troops who drop, without warning, onto
the necks of our enemies.
Larger and more efficient loads are
being parachuted into the drop zones
and efficient methods of resupply are
being developed and tested in the Korean
campaign. \Vhere the jumping of
a jeep was once considered a novelty,
the huge 6 x 6 is now dropped with little
misgiving. Only a few years ago the pack
75mm howitzer was the artillery piece
for parachutists; today, the 105 is commonly
dropped and the 155 is air transported
with nonjumping troops.
Airborne antiaircraft, however, has
made little progress. \Ve have a poorly
defined mission, a poor system of employment
and are inadequately equipped for
maximum employment, particularly in
reference to our role in ground support.
Recommendation One: Remove AAA,
in its present form, from the assault.
Present tactical doctrine calls for an
assault on H-hour, with airborne troops
pouring from the sky to help seize and
defend the drop zones from enemy low
Hying aircraft. To do what might appear
to be a mansized job, the jumping antiaircraftsmen
are equipped with boys'
tools. The assault is made with the
dubious aid of the 1\163, a single barreled
caliber .50 machine gun, on an M
mount.
In my opinion, there is little need for
airborne AA in the assault. As Major
General Ga\'in points out in his excellent
work, "Airborne \Varfare," such an operation
requires total air superiority.
\Vith air superiority, there is no need
for antiaircraft. Even if enemy aircraft
slip past our fighters, and it is conceivable,
our own AAA could not be allowed
to open fire, for fear of destroying our
own planes.
There is also a lack of transportation
to move it. Just to air transport an AAA
battalion (a'1d I have Tl'vl 71-210 before
me) takes dozens of huge carrier aircraft,
and the airborne commander will need
those planes to drop his infantry, field
artillery and other true assault forces.
Resupply for all of these troops is a terrific
problem, and there is simply little or
no room for airborne A!v\ at this time.
1\1Y theory is partially borne out by Korean
developments, too, as the 187th
Regimental Combat Team didn't make
use of their AA people until 0 plus 2,
when they were allowed to jump in,
equipped with pack 75mm howitzers!
Recommendation Two: Equip airborne
AA with more mobile weapons!
After the assault, the airborne AM
Fairchild Aircraft Photo-by Dan Frankfurter
Loading the 40mm gun on carriage.
battalion is supposed to drop in or air
transport in its heavier equipment. At
this time, equipped with towed 40mm
guns and the M55, quadruple mounted
caliber .50 machine guns, it goes into a
role comparable to its counterpart in the
regular infantry division. However, the
airborne division is a hard striking, rapid
moving outfit; the weapons with its AAA
battalion are hardly suitable for anything
so mobile. Even though the AA guns are
brought into the battle area early there is
no pro\'ision for moving them. Airborne
troops expect to receive no motor vehicles,
other than possibly a jeep or so,
and they are taught to manhandle their
guns.
My recommendation would be to
equip the 'airborne AAA battalion with
the equipment now current in the selfpropelled
unit and to allow it to join the
division when priorities are not so critical.
Since our chances at enemy aircraft
will probably be less than our chances at
enemy ground personnel, we should be
given something that we can chase the
enemy with; something as mobile as the
rest of our division.
Recommendation Three: Give us a
dual purpose.
Airborne antiaircraft could be made
more useful to the division commander
if it had a dual purpose. I agree that
there is a definite need for antiaircraft
after the assault, the same as with the
infantry division. But I think, too, that
the days of assault could give these paratroopers
a chance to show their worth.
I advocate equipping the airborne AA
battalion with recoilless weapons, giant
bazookas and such other light antitank
equipment as we develop. Allow AM
detachments to jump in the assault and
act as a tank killer team. At no other
time is the airborne division so vulnerable
to the tank as during the assault,
and at no other time is the AAA more
useless to them. They could be utilized
to help achieve the division objecti\.e.
Then when their self-propelled equipment
does reach them it should be such
equipment as can be truly useful in the
dual role now played by AM-that of
antiaircraft and ground support, so common
in Korea.
60 ANTIAIRCRAFT JOURNAL