July-August - Air Defense Artillery
July-August - Air Defense Artillery
July-August - Air Defense Artillery
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Silver Star<br />
SERGEANT FIRST CLASS CHARLES M. BAMfORD,<br />
while a member of Battery D, 15th<br />
AM AW Bn. (SP), distinguished himself by<br />
gallantry in action against on armed enemy<br />
near the Chasin Reservoir in Korea, during<br />
the period 29 November 1950 to 30 November<br />
1950. On 29 November, when the unit<br />
was attacked by a numerically superior force,<br />
Sergeant Bamford, who was then battery<br />
Mess Sergeant, lost his kitchen due to the<br />
enemy action. He then voluntarily assumed<br />
the task of assisting in bringing wounded men<br />
from their positions to the aid station and<br />
assisted in making the wounded more comfortable<br />
alter they had been treated. In so doing,<br />
Sergeant Bamford exposed himself to intense<br />
enemy automatic weapons, mortar, and small<br />
arms fire on many occasions. On 30 November<br />
while aiding wounded men, Sergeant<br />
Bamford was wounded himself by enemy fire .<br />
Immediately alter receiving first aid, he resumed<br />
his task of bringing in and caring for<br />
other wounded men, again exposing himself<br />
to the hazards of the heavy enemy fire. As<br />
a result of his repeated disregard for his<br />
own safety in going to the assistance of others<br />
he was wounded t.• ice by enemy fire. Again,<br />
despite his three . ounds, Sergeant Bamford<br />
voluntarily continu~1d to assist and care for<br />
other disabled mer "mtil on 2 December 1950<br />
he was reported as nissing in action. His outstanding<br />
heroism :,elped Save the lives of<br />
many men, lightened the heavy burden of<br />
the medical personnel and inspired his comrades.<br />
His gallantry in action reflects great<br />
credit on himself and the military service.<br />
x x x California.<br />
platoon contact is normally by radio only.<br />
In the course of battle, tactical communication<br />
with infantry elements is maintained<br />
through use of SCR 300's or<br />
liaison with nearby tank clements. Fire<br />
missions, orders to shift or cease fire, and<br />
other instructions are thus received from<br />
the suppo~ted infantry commander by<br />
the AAA platoon leader who transmits<br />
these instructions to his guns by radio<br />
and/or hand or other visual signals.<br />
AMMUNITION<br />
EMPLOYMENT in the ground role<br />
results in sizable expenditures of ammunition.<br />
It is not unusual for four M16's<br />
to fire fifty thousand rounds during one<br />
M16's readying to attack Changgo-ri.<br />
JULY-AUGUST, 1951<br />
engagement of a few hours duration.<br />
Ammuniiton resupply problems, if not<br />
carefully anticipated, can be troublesome.<br />
The problem is further aggravated<br />
by the inability to use trailers with<br />
1\116's supporting infantry. \Ve have<br />
found that trailers reduce the maneu-<br />
\'erability of the track to such an extent<br />
that they are a hindrance<br />
used.<br />
and cannot be<br />
Our approach to the ammunition<br />
problem entails three principles-conservation,<br />
a large basic load, and perpetual<br />
resen'e stocks.<br />
The conservation policy requires that<br />
four barrels be fired onh, in emeroencies<br />
against enemy attack<br />
• 0 '<br />
or for saturation<br />
fire in the initial phase of infantry attacks.<br />
For normal firinoo two barrels are<br />
employed.<br />
Each M 16 carries a basic load of eioht o<br />
thousand rounds. This load is carried on<br />
the Roor of the carriage.<br />
Continual reserve stocks are maintained<br />
at regimental ASp's and at the<br />
battery headquarters. Regimental ammunition<br />
officers maintain a day's supply of<br />
from 60 to 80 thousand rounds. From<br />
this supply the AAA battery commander<br />
maintains a level of 25 to 30 thousand<br />
rounds. Batteries transport ammunition<br />
from the regimental ASP to platoon positions<br />
with two 2Y.!-Ton Cargo trucks<br />
made available for this purpose by battalion<br />
headquarters, One truck works<br />
forward from the battery Gp. to platoon<br />
positions while the other works back to<br />
regimental ASP. \Vhen terrain or the<br />
situation requires 1'.l3's are used to shuttle<br />
ammunition from the truck at a<br />
rendezvous point to the gun positions.<br />
1'.116ADAPTEDTO GROUNDROLE<br />
THE 1'.116,old World War II veteran<br />
that it is, has found new glory in Korean<br />
fighting. But as a ground support weapon<br />
it has several inherent disadvantages.<br />
Foremost among these is the lack of crew<br />
protection. \Vorking in close support of<br />
the infantry brings our crew members<br />
within enemy small-arms range. The<br />
high silhouette of the weapons and its<br />
scant armor make 1\116 crews particularly<br />
vulnerable to enemy fire. It soon<br />
became apparent that unless steps were<br />
taken to reduce the vulnerability of our<br />
crews, we would suffer many casualties.<br />
\Vhen the battalion commander advised<br />
the CG, division artillery and the division<br />
commander of this problem, he<br />
found staunch supporters for his desire<br />
that every effort be made to reduce this<br />
threat. The division ordnance officer was<br />
instructed to work with the battalion<br />
commander on the development of an<br />
U.S. Army Photo<br />
Light machine gun mounted to cover<br />
cab dead space area.<br />
armor shield for the turret to protect<br />
crews from small-arms fire and shell<br />
fragments. In a matter of days a template<br />
was designed, a pilot model fabricated<br />
and attached to an 1\116 turret. The<br />
1\116 was then put through road and<br />
turret tests to determine whether the<br />
added 200 pounds of the shield would<br />
adversely affect the turret drive mechanism.<br />
Results showed no adverse effects.<br />
The experimental shield was then shown<br />
to the army commander, who ordered<br />
that all 1\'116's in the Eighth Army be<br />
similarly equipped as rapidly as shields<br />
could be manufactured and installed.<br />
An inspection of our shields will attest<br />
to their effectiveness. Pocked with indentations<br />
from riRe and machine gun<br />
bullets, they have prevented many casualties<br />
and have done much to reassure<br />
exposed cannoneers.<br />
Efforts to reduce crew vulnerability<br />
did not stop with the addition of weapon<br />
armor. Armored \'ests for crew members<br />
were also procured. These "flak suits"<br />
arc worn by all crew members when in<br />
action and have proved to be lifesavers<br />
on several occasions.<br />
In one respect 1\ 116 crew protection<br />
has been surprisingly good. Enemy land<br />
mine damage to \'ehicles has been extensi\'e,<br />
accounting for total loss of ten<br />
1\116's. In these ten encounters onlv two<br />
men were gravely injured. /<br />
The most serious injuries resulted<br />
from concussion and collision with vehicle<br />
fixtures. Indications are that two features<br />
of the 1'.116 carriage are responsible for<br />
this protection. The armor plate naturally<br />
provides some protection. 1'.lines<br />
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