Final Evaluation of the - UNEP

UNEP/UNDP and UNOPS to upset NORAD by taking appropriate action against Oslo for
their lack of performance. UNEP, UNDP and UNOPS kept NORAD informed, but this did
not lead to a resolution of the problems. The Regional Coordination Unit spent much time
trying to coordinate with Oslo but without any decision-making authority. The RCU did not
play a badly needed technical advisory role but rather a coordination role with the Oslo
research component. The RCU was unsuccessful in establishing a working relationship with
Oslo. Rating of RPSC: Moderately Unsatisfactory.
Progress after MTE
60. One of the constraints encountered in this project is the design itself. The ToR for the
MTE included an assessment of the project design, so it is unnecessary to repeat the
comments on the design itself. Some efforts were made to refocus and redesign but it has been
too little and too late. Moreover, there was insufficient time between MTE and FE for
redirection to take effect. The Kenya project was provided with a revised logframe, some
activities were stopped but FE considered that most of the changes following the MTE needed
more time to take effect. The exception was the new contracts handed to local institutions and
Universities which took over work which was initially to be done by the University of Oslo.
Botswana
61. Botswana has no recent history of pastoralism. On many of the communal lands, grazing
is a free for all. A large portion of the communal lands in Botswana has been divided into
privately leased “ranches” over the past 30 years: government policies and programmes has
encouraged this de facto privatisation of communal lands. Botswana ranchers, however, have
dual grazing rights. They can pasture their livestock on communal lands until the pasture is
depleted, then move their livestock back onto their ranch for the duration of the dry season. It
is not known how important this factor of dual grazing rights is as a cause of land degradation
but it is a barrier to the development of CBRM. Breakdown in traditional land/pasture rights
is a major cause of degradation. Like the Nara and Kenya sites, the communities in Botswana
once had traditionally defined community land rights with boundaries recognized by all.
These dithota are no longer operational because they are not legally recognized. A further
constraint is that the government has subsidized private ranches for the drilling of boreholes,
and for supplementary feed of livestock during droughts, which results in larger numbers of
livestock being carried through a drought, with consequently higher pressures on the range.
These subsidies provide disincentives for sustainable range management on communal lands.
62. In Botswana, Land Boards grant individuals the right to drill and control boreholes on
communal lands. Most borehole owners are not from the local village but generally wealthy
urban dwellers using a family relative with little education to manage the borehole. In the dry
season, control of water gives the borehole owner de facto control of the range resource
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