30.06.2013 Views

The Myth of Ethnic Conflict: Chap 13 - Diplomatic Institute

The Myth of Ethnic Conflict: Chap 13 - Diplomatic Institute

The Myth of Ethnic Conflict: Chap 13 - Diplomatic Institute

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

478 Maria Todorova<br />

other institutions. Yet this very emphasis on the unifying potential<br />

<strong>of</strong> language stressed at the same time its exclusiveness and the rigidity<br />

<strong>of</strong> the ethnic boundaries it delineated. This precluded the integration<br />

(except in the cases <strong>of</strong> assimilation) <strong>of</strong> different linguistic<br />

groups into a single nation.<br />

Moreover, not only did groups <strong>of</strong> different linguistic background<br />

from the dominant ethnic group in the nation-state prove<br />

impossible to integrate; so also did groups <strong>of</strong> identical ethnic background<br />

and speakers <strong>of</strong> the same (or dialects <strong>of</strong> the same) language,<br />

like the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, the Slavic Bosnian Muslims,<br />

the Torbeshi in Macedonia, etc. <strong>The</strong>se cases invoke the general problem<br />

<strong>of</strong> religion as a political boundary, that <strong>of</strong> the Balkan Muslims<br />

in particular. Despite the fact that language indeed had become the<br />

nucleus <strong>of</strong> different ethnic and national identities among the Balkan<br />

Christians (Orthodox for the most part), it could not raze the fundamental<br />

boundary between Muslims and Christians that had been<br />

established during the centuries <strong>of</strong> Ottoman rule. <strong>The</strong> reason for this<br />

was not, as the great bulk <strong>of</strong> Balkan and foreign historiography<br />

maintains, the fact that Orthodoxy played a major and crucial role<br />

in nation-building. 17 In fact, “religion came last in the struggle to<br />

forge new national identities” and in some cases “did not become a<br />

functional element in national definition until the nation-states had<br />

nationalized their churches.” 18 It never could be a sufficient component<br />

<strong>of</strong> national self-identity, and even in the national struggles its<br />

primary contribution was to strengthen the opposition to the Muslim<br />

rulers. 19 Within the Orthodox ecumene, the process <strong>of</strong> nation-building<br />

demonstrated “the essential incompatibility between the imagined<br />

community <strong>of</strong> religion and the imagined community <strong>of</strong> the<br />

nation.” 20<br />

This does not mean that the religious boundary between Christianity<br />

and Islam was the only divider. Clearly the different Christian<br />

denominations, and particularly the opposition between Orthodoxy<br />

and Catholicism, presented additional frontiers <strong>of</strong> tension. Yet these<br />

frontiers did not prove as insurmountable. 21 Ironically Balkan nationalism,<br />

which irrevocably destroyed the imagined community <strong>of</strong><br />

Orthodox Christianity, managed to preserve a frozen, unchangeable<br />

and stultifyingly uniform image <strong>of</strong> the Muslim community and consistently<br />

dealt with it in millet terms. In other words, the Christian<br />

populations <strong>of</strong> the Balkans began speaking, among themselves, the

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!