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Insanity and diminished capacity 8 The legal test for pathological incapacity is identical to that for nonpathological incapacity practitioners in the U.S. American conceptions of insanity are much broader than those found in South African law. Consequently, a wide range of psychological states, which do not necessarily have a biological basis, are considered to be instances of insanity (Slovenko, 1995). The inclusion of an array of diagnoses as grounds for exculpation has been viewed as problematic by various legal commentators. Dershowitz (1994), for example, is sceptical of the mitigating function of syndrome evidence involving allegations of abuse. He views such evidence as an ‘abuse excuse’ which purely functions as a means of evading responsibility. He comments on psychiatry and psychology’s complicity in helping offenders to evade appropriate punishment by providing them with ‘cop-outs’ and ‘sob stories’ couched in psychological jargon. He feels that this kind of evidence threatens the foundations of the American legal system as it expands the parameters of excusable behaviour. This kind of thinking, along with the public outcry subsequent to the acquittal of John Hinckley 5 , has resulted in the re-evaluation of the insanity defence at both state and federal levels in the US. Consequently, some American jurisdictions have abolished the defence while in others the McNaughton rules have been modified (Steadman, McGreevy, Morrissey, Callahan, Robbins and Cirincione, 1993). Slovenko (1995) argues that it is difficult to establish the current status of the insanity defence in America, given the many changes which it has undergone in various states. Current debate has centred on whether or not the defence should be abolished completely, particularly because it is seen as a loophole for those who should be subject to the full force of the law. Some proponents of abolition argue that criminal responsibility is a matter of law and should be left to juries for deliberation and not to the assessment of psychiatric experts. Slovenko says that these critics argue that ‘psychiatry is corrupting the criminal justice system by expanding the concept of mental illness, always at the expense of the concept of responsibility’ (1995, p.34). While South African law has not been plagued with the same conundrums, there is some controversy regarding the legal test which is applied. The debate centres on the fact that the tests for pathological and non-pathological incapacity are identical. The defence of non-pathological incapacity acknowledges that psychological states such as anger, fear, shock and emotional stress may render a person non-responsible for his or her actions. Consequently, the circumstances within which an accused may be exculpated are substantially broadened. Unlike a successful insanity plea, a verdict of not guilty does not imply indefinite hospitalisation. Instead the accused is free to resume his or her life. Petty (1998) argues that the application of the provisions within s78 (1) of the CPA to what are in fact two distinct mental states, is problematic. The dilemma which this poses is exacerbated by the fact that because the law construes mental illness in terms of the degree of criminal responsibility, no diagnostic parameters have been set. From a psychological perspective, there is a clear distinction between distress and impairment caused by pathology and that which is caused by a temporary emotional state. However, these kinds of 5 Public outcry followed the 1982 insanity acquittal of John Hinckley following the assassination attempt on President Reagan (Steadman, McGreevy, Morrissey, Callahan, Robbins and Cirincione, 1993).
Africa 9 distinctions are not central to legal deliberations because the court is concerned with whether the accused met the criteria for the legal test and not with the nature of the mental state. Petty (1998) feels that the lack of conceptual clarity and the fact that the defences can be raised in the alternative, present challenges for the psychologist. Consequently, the boundaries between the defences are blurred, resulting in ‘an anomalous, circuitous process whereby the court applies the test for criminal capacity...’ (Petty, 1998, p. 4). Diminished Responsibility South African law, in line with Anglo-American jurisdictions, acknowledges that there are varying degrees of criminal responsibility. As a result, Section 78(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977) states that: If the court finds that the accused at the time of the commission of the act in question was criminally responsible for the act but that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act or to act in accordance with an appreciation of wrongfulness of the act was diminished by reason of mental illness or mental defect, the court may take the fact of such diminished responsibility into account when sentencing the accused. In terms of this provision, the accused may be suffering from some form of mental illness but the level of impairment experienced does not fulfil the requirements for the legal test of insanity. The pathology is then considered to be a mitigating factor in the degree of responsibility. A defence of diminished responsibility does not afford the accused complete exculpation, but may result in a reduced sentence instead of indefinite confinement to a state psychiatric hospital (Snyman, 2002). Controversy It stands to reason that expert testimony is required to establish that an abnormality of the mind existed at the time of the offence. However some English legal commentators have questioned the role which psychiatrists and psychologists play in assessing diminished responsibility. In a report by the Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (cited in Clarkson and Keating, 1990), the proficiency of such experts in assessing degrees of mental responsibility was questioned, since this is a concept of law and morality and not of psychiatry or psychology. The Committee questioned whether the accused’s ability to conform to the law could be measured clinically given that the law requires a substantial impairment of mental responsibility. Allen argues that ‘ the question of substantial impairment is inappropriate for medical witnesses as it is one of degree and whether it exists depends not only on the medical evidence but on all the evidence of the case relating to the facts and circumstances of the killing’ (1995, p. 128). He argues that the courts have allowed expert opinion in these matters so as to produce a greater range of exemptions from murder. Activity 8.78. Discuss the elements of the defence of diminished responsibility
Page 1 and 2: 8 INSANITY AND DIMINISHED CAPACITY
Page 3 and 4: Africa 3 Insanity is a legally defi
Page 5 and 6: Africa 5 The jury found McNaughton
Page 7: Africa 7 person’s functioning has
Page 11 and 12: Africa 11 episodes of sexual abuse
Page 13 and 14: Africa 13 those who have been found
Page 15 and 16: Africa 15 An example of the way in
Page 17 and 18: Africa 17 an indispensable role bec
Page 19 and 20: Africa 19 arguing that Emma cannot

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