Bolívar Distorted: The Effects of Exchange Controls on the ...
Bolívar Distorted: The Effects of Exchange Controls on the ...
Bolívar Distorted: The Effects of Exchange Controls on the ...
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shown both in his ability to influence exchange rate regimes and his inability to extract<br />
additi<strong>on</strong>al funds from internati<strong>on</strong>al reserves. His c<strong>on</strong>trol over how government revenues are<br />
spent is more refined given his m<strong>on</strong>opoly <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> Nati<strong>on</strong>al Assembly and o<strong>the</strong>r governing bodies.<br />
However, with <strong>the</strong> exchange set artificially low, Chávez receives fewer bolivars for <strong>the</strong> dollars<br />
earned from oil revenues and reduces his ability to hand out political favors through government<br />
spending. Through CADIVI, Chávez can rati<strong>on</strong> foreign exchange to preferred importers,<br />
allowing <strong>the</strong>m to buy dollars at a cheap rate; in effect, <strong>the</strong>y are recipients <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a quota revenue.<br />
This pushes <strong>the</strong> parallel market rate up as n<strong>on</strong>-preferred importers are excluded from <strong>the</strong> process.<br />
As importers pay higher prices for goods, those losses are passed <strong>on</strong> to c<strong>on</strong>sumers, who pay<br />
higher prices for all imported goods and preferred importers reap <strong>the</strong> benefits. In effect, Chávez<br />
distributes quota revenues to preferred importers.<br />
Since inflati<strong>on</strong> began to take <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g>f a few years ago, <strong>the</strong> m<strong>on</strong>ey stock has been rising at a<br />
rate much slower than <strong>the</strong> rate that prices have been rising 95 . Such a result is typical in a stagnant<br />
ec<strong>on</strong>omy where investors are fleeing an inflating currency. Inflati<strong>on</strong> combined with low interest<br />
rates, <strong>the</strong> result <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> a prohibiti<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> foreign investing, make <strong>the</strong> bolivar a poor store <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> value and<br />
reduces <strong>the</strong> demand for m<strong>on</strong>ey, pushing up <strong>the</strong> price level. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> implementati<strong>on</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> <strong>the</strong> exchange<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trols combined with price c<strong>on</strong>trols <strong>on</strong> some products have reversed <strong>the</strong> comparis<strong>on</strong>, causing<br />
prices to rise more slowly than <strong>the</strong> m<strong>on</strong>ey stock. Reserves have rebounded under <strong>the</strong> exchange<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trols, but prices <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> many goods, mainly imported goods, are still rising. <str<strong>on</strong>g>The</str<strong>on</strong>g> exchange<br />
c<strong>on</strong>trols did meet <strong>the</strong>ir purported goal <str<strong>on</strong>g>of</str<strong>on</strong>g> halting <strong>the</strong> fall in reserves, but <strong>the</strong>re are better methods<br />
available for slowing inflati<strong>on</strong>, <strong>on</strong>es that do not pose <strong>the</strong> opportunity for <strong>the</strong> president to<br />
distribute quota revenues to preferred importers and banks. A commitment to keep m<strong>on</strong>ey<br />
growth in line with GDP growth, for example would be more appropriate.<br />
95 See Appendix IV, Graph 3.<br />
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