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CROSS-EXAMINATION
THE ADVOCATE Volume 30, No.1 January 2008
Scope – The Kentucky Rules of Evidence embody a rule of wide open cross-examination and allow
questioning concerning any matter relevant to any issue in the case, subject to judicial discretion
regarding the control of the interrogation of witnesses and the production of evidence. KRE 611,
Derossett v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 195 (Ky.1993).
The credibility of a witness may always be questioned. KRE 607 says: “The credibility of a witness
may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.” KRE 611(b) says: “A
witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.”
Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
preserve the right to confront witnesses.
According to KRE 611(a), cross-examination may be limited by the court in order to, “(1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth; (2) avoid needless
consumption of time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” The
question then becomes, when do such limitations violate the fundamental constitutional rights at
stake?
Any refusal to allow cross-examination on bias when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the
prosecution’s case constitutes reversible error. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct.
1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111 (1974),
Commonwealth v. Cox, 837 S.W.2d 898 (Ky.1992). In Cox the defendant was not allowed to conduct
any cross-examination of the witness. Furthermore, the denial of effective cross-examination requires
automatic reversal and prejudice need not be demonstrated. Eldred v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d
694, 702 (Ky.1994), overruled on other grounds. Since a limitation on impeachment impinges on a
defendant’s right to confrontation, a court should err on the side of allowing impeachment. Caudill
v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky.2003).
Legal Standard - In Weaver v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Ky.1997), the court held that, in
order for the right to confront to be satisfied, the jury must be given enough information to make
the desired inference. In Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 151 S.W.3d 332 (Ky.2004), and Commonwealth
v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky.1997), the court held that “So long as a reasonably complete
picture of the witness’ veracity, bias and motivation is developed, the judge enjoys power and
discretion to set appropriate boundaries.” Maddox at 721, quoting U.S. v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 254
(1 st Cir.1990). In Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196 (Ky.2003), the court held that a defendant
must be allowed “reasonable” cross-examination in order to demonstrate the witness’ bias, animosity,
or any other reason why the witness might testify falsely. In Spears v. Commonwealth, 558 S.W.2d
641, 642 (Ky.App.1977), the court held that “In weighing the testimony the jury should be in
possession of all facts calculated to exert influence on a witness.”, quoted in Davenport v.
Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Ky.2005). It is generally reversible error to refuse to allow
cross-examination when “the facts clearly support an inference that the witness was biased, and
when the potential for bias exceeds mere speculation.” Davenport, supra, at 769.
The test on review of a court’s refusal to allow cross-examination is whether “a reasonable jury
might have received a significantly different impression of the witness’ credibility had defense
counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination.” Davenport v.
Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 763 (Ky.2005), Commonwealth v. Cox, 837 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Ky.1992),
quoting Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232, 109 S.Ct. 480, 483, 102 L.Ed.2d 513, 520 (1988), quoting
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683 (1986).
Parole or Probation – Refusal to allow cross-examination on the fact that the witness was on
probation was reversible error when the witness was crucial to Commonwealth’s case, and the
witness’s testimony lacked corroboration. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d
347 (1974), Commonwealth v. Cox, 837 S.W.2d 898 (Ky.1992). But compare Davenport, supra, in
which the witness’ probation was in another county and his testimony was corroborated by other
prosecution witnesses.
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NOTES