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OPERATION BRIDGE - Cumbria Constabulary

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GPMS RESTRICTED<br />

3.35 Section 14. - Conclusion - Could the Incident Have Been<br />

Prevented? – This section summarises the entire facts as they are<br />

presented throughout the report and addresses the key questions<br />

that were asked at the beginning of the process.<br />

3.36 Section 15. – Glossary of Acronyms - This section provides a list of<br />

acronyms used within this document in order for them to be<br />

understood by those not used to the specific terms.<br />

3.37 Observations and Recommendations - Within the following<br />

paragraphs, I have recreated all of the Observations and<br />

Recommendations that I have identified within the body of the report<br />

for ease of reference.<br />

3.38 Observation 1: The local Airwave Radio Channel was overwhelmed<br />

by the radio traffic caused by this incident. This became more acute<br />

when armed officers from neighbouring forces deployed to <strong>Cumbria</strong><br />

as they were unable to access the local channel.<br />

3.39 Observation 2 makes specific comment on how high volume<br />

communication usage can be minimised within an Armed policing<br />

communication structure.<br />

3.40 Observation 2: That <strong>Cumbria</strong> <strong>Constabulary</strong> considers options to<br />

ensure that the Tactical Firearms Commander can communicate<br />

directly with armed police officers under their command whilst<br />

minimising interference with the incident command channel during<br />

more complex incidents.<br />

3.41 Observation 3: Interoperability between the police service and<br />

ambulance service should be improved. This is particularly true in<br />

relation to differing risk thresholds.<br />

3.42 Observation 4: The decision to deploy a trained negotiator and to<br />

make the first attempts to contact Derrick BIRD without delay was<br />

sound. To achieve this within such a fast moving incident and be able<br />

to place the first call only 42 minutes after the police were first made<br />

aware of the incident, is commendable.<br />

3.43 Observation 5: <strong>Cumbria</strong> <strong>Constabulary</strong> quickly identified that it had a<br />

duty to warn the public. They used their media line, their website,<br />

shop watch radio links, direct phone calls to vulnerable locations and<br />

the use of “sky shout” from the police helicopter to warn the public.<br />

3.44 The review team commends the proactive use of the media and other<br />

means to warn members of the public in this case.<br />

THIS REPORT IS EMBARGOED<br />

UNTIL 4PM MONDAY 28 TH MARCH 2011<br />

10

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