OPERATION BRIDGE - Cumbria Constabulary
OPERATION BRIDGE - Cumbria Constabulary
OPERATION BRIDGE - Cumbria Constabulary
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3.53 Observation 13: That <strong>Cumbria</strong> <strong>Constabulary</strong> consider raising the<br />
subject of call signs with the ACPO Lead for Airwave<br />
Communications. If the UK were to adopt a national call sign<br />
structure for specialist roles, any patrol deployed on mutual aid would<br />
be immediately recognised.<br />
(This would be particularly useful for PSU’s, Dog Handlers, DVI<br />
Teams, Negotiators, Search Teams and Firearms Officers).<br />
3.54 Observation 14: <strong>Cumbria</strong> <strong>Constabulary</strong> may wish to re-examine the<br />
standard operating procedures and interoperability between the<br />
various organisations that provide air support within <strong>Cumbria</strong>.<br />
3.55 The difficulties that were presented with the use of the helicopters<br />
were not unique to the police service. Their primary use was casualty<br />
evacuation and therefore the Ambulance Service should play a<br />
pivotal role.<br />
3.56 Visibility for the staff within the various helicopters was particularly<br />
poor on the 2nd June 2010. The low cloud made flying particularly<br />
difficult. The crews of each of the aircraft should be commended for<br />
their perseverance.<br />
3.57 Observation 15: That <strong>Cumbria</strong> <strong>Constabulary</strong> take the opportunity to<br />
reassess its position with regards to the overt carriage of firearms by<br />
its ARV crews.<br />
3.58 Recommendation 1: That <strong>Cumbria</strong> <strong>Constabulary</strong> review its policy<br />
with regard to the deployment of ARVs, with emphasis on the<br />
challenge presented by geography and the road network.<br />
3.59 Recommendation 2: That <strong>Cumbria</strong> <strong>Constabulary</strong> considers access<br />
to intelligence resources during weekends and evenings. The<br />
provision of an intelligence capability within the force control room on<br />
a 24/7 basis is achieved within many forces and could benefit<br />
<strong>Cumbria</strong>.<br />
3.60 Recommendation 3: That <strong>Cumbria</strong> <strong>Constabulary</strong> nominate an<br />
Operational Firearms Commander at the start of each tour of duty.<br />
3.61 Recommendation 4: That <strong>Cumbria</strong> <strong>Constabulary</strong> convert the<br />
existing Gold Command Suite, at Force Headquarters, into a fully<br />
functioning Command Suite suitable for a Tactical Firearms<br />
Commander to take command of a firearms operation.<br />
3.62 Recommendation 5: That the CNC adopt the full range of firearms<br />
tactical options as used by the Home Office forces nationally. That<br />
they also adopt the same glossary of terms that are used to describe<br />
this tactic to facilitate an effective interoperability.<br />
THIS REPORT IS EMBARGOED<br />
UNTIL 4PM MONDAY 28 TH MARCH 2011<br />
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